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Anomaly detection is an important and indispensable aspect of any computer
security mechanism. Ad hoc and mobile networks consist of a number of peer mobile
nodes that are capable of communicating with each other absent a fixed infrastructure.
Arbitrary node movements and lack of centralized control make them vulnerable to a
wide variety of unknown and known attacks from inside as well as from outside. In
this dissertation we propose two efficient statistical techniques for anomaly detection
for these networks.
We present a mobility-pattern-based (MPB) anomaly detection algorithm that
can identify abnormal pattern behavior of nodes in mobile networks. MPB
characterizes the mobility profile of a node by a Multi-Leaf tree structure in which
each node corresponds to a possible destination cluster. Through data mining and
fuzzy logic techniques, a normal mobility profile is generated during the training
process, and abnormal patterns are distinguished from the normal during testing.
Statistical simulations demonstrate that proposed MPB algorithm achieves reasonably
low false alarm rates (FAR) and sufficiently high detection rates (DR).
In order to take into account incomplete testing samples and the interaction
among multiple features, we present BANBAD •- a technique using Belief Networks
and Bayesian inference. BANBAD identifies abnormal behavior in any feature, e.g.,
inappropriate energy consumption of a node in the network. By applying structure
learning techniques to the training dataset, it extracts the dependencies among

relevant features and represents them by a directed acyclic graph. Probability
distributions are associated with the nodes (i.e., features) and edges of the graph.
BANBAD maintains this belief network as a dynamic, updated normal profile of
feature behaviors and then uses a specific Bayesian inference algorithm to detect
abnormal behavior in testing data. Our technique works especially well in ad hoc
networks but is applicable to other networks including wireless and sensor networks.
The proposed method bounds FAR at a predefined threshold and maximizes DR.
Experimental results demonstrate excellent performance for synthetic as well as real
datasets. The real datasets are taken from Intel Lab Data (lab environment monitored
by the sensors) and UMASS Trace Repository (users' laptop usage).
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

1.1 Motivation
Ad hoc and mobile networks consist of a number of peer mobile nodes that are
capable of communicating with each other absent a fixed infrastructure. However,
arbitrary node movements and lack of centralized control make them vulnerable to a
wide variety of attacks from inside as well as from outside. Therefore, providing
effective security protection is important to ensure the continued viability of Ad hoc
and mobile networks in a variety of pursuits.
In general, two complementary approaches exist to protect a system:
prevention and detection. Intrusion prevention techniques, such as encryption and
authentication, attempt to deter and block attackers. Unfortunately, prevention
techniques can only reduce intrusions, not completely eliminate them [1-2]. Despite
the amount or quality of intrusion prevention measures, an intelligent attacker can
exploit a single security hole to break into a system. Nothing is absolutely secure.
Therefore, intrusion detection systems (IDSs) are indispensable for a reliable system.
They serve as the important secondary line of defense.
Intrusion detection can be based either on detecting misuses or detecting
anomalies. A misuse-based detection technique checks potential security breaches
1

against known attack signatures and system vulnerabilities. If it finds a match, an
alarm is generated. Since it is impossible to know all future attacks-or attack patternsin advance, misuse detection techniques are not effective in detecting new or
unknown attacks. Given the constantly evolving nature of security breaches, anomalybased techniques are needed. An anomaly-based detection technique models normal
behavior by creating profiles of system and node states during the training process.
During the testing process, it compares deviations from the normal profiles to
determine whether a deviation is significant. If so, an alarm is triggered. Therefore,
anomaly detection can check a whole host of different and new types of attacks.
While misuse detection may be more efficient, anomaly detection is more
comprehensive. In security, comprehensiveness is best. Anything less leaves systems
open for attack.
Efficiently establishing and maintaining profiles for nodes is crucial for
anomaly detection. Unfortunately, the mobility of nodes inherent in ad hoc network
makes profile generation difficult. Furthermore, because of the ad hoc nature of the
network, availability of complete data is often not possible; therefore a technique
handling incomplete data is desired. A technique based on belief networks is
proposed in this dissertation to address these issues. Our technique will be referred as
BANBAD - Belief Network Based Anomaly Detection.
In Chapter III, we propose a novel approach to construct the normal mobility
profile of a node, from which an efficient mobility-pattern-based (MPB) anomaly
detection algorithm is designed. The sequence of the clusters and mobility pattern

strings traversed by a node is used as the feature. When an intrusion occurs, the
attacker tends to have a different mobility pattern. We can detect anomaly by
comparing it with the normal mobility profile of that node.
MPB technique facilitates detection of anomaly in a single feature such as the
mobility. However, in a typical system multiple features interact with each other and
the question of designing a technique that can handle multiple features arises. We thus
propose BANBAD that has the ability to handle multiple features anomaly detection
starting from chapter IV. One of the main purposes of our research is to try to address
the shortcomings (please see section 2.2 for specific details), to the best of our
capabilities, in current anomaly detection methods to create an affordable, efficient,
and effective anomaly detection method for ad hoc networks. The key improvements
of the proposed BANBAD is the ability to obtain high detection rate (DR) while
decreasing false alarm rate (FAR), be able to bound FAR, and handle incomplete
samples.

1.2 Problem Definitions
1.2.1

Mobility-pattern-based (MPB) anomaly detection

Since mobility is the most typical and most crucial feature of a node in mobile
networks, we focus on the detection of subtle difference by handling close points and
approximate mobility patterns of mobile networks. Our algorithm attempts to detect
one of the most important active attacks — the deviation from the normal mobility
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patterns from a starting point to any subsequent point. In this context, point is not a
single geographical point; instead it implies a cluster or a region. Consider Figure 1.1
that shows few possible paths from a point a/ in region A to a point bj in region B:

a
Figure 1.1: Threat model of MPB.

There are two geographical areas, A and B as well as four routes, Rl:
ai—*o—*bi, R2: «/—->o'—>&/, R3: a/—^m—>bi and R.4: ai—>m,—>b/\ which all have two
hops starting from starting point a/ to destination point, b/ or b/'. We assume bi and
Z>/ are very close and the angle a -/_m aim'' is very small.
Case 1: Suppose Rl is the normal route, then the other 3 routes should be
treated as anomalies. Note b\ and 6/' are close and R2, R3 & R4 can be reached

within the same time period (2 hops). Even if R2 has the same pattern distributions as
Rl, we still need to classify it as an anomaly route.
Case 2: Suppose R3 is the normal route. Based on the obvious deviations, it's
still easy to classify R] and R2 as anomalies, but what about R4?
2.1. If the situation occurs in the training process, should we treat R3 and R4
as 2 distinct routes or integrate them as just 1 route? What are the shortcomings of the
former solution? And if we choose the latter solution, what classifies the set of
"close" normal routes?
2.2. If the situation occurs during the testing process, can we classify R4 as the
normal route? Or as an anomaly? Is there any quantified approach, that exists to solve
such problems?
Clearly, case 2 is the most challenging issue. It tries to address the problem
with many closer points and mobility patterns in an observed cluster set. Our
proposed algorithm attempts to handle close proximity of mobility patterns.

1.2.2

Belief networks based anomaly detection

MPB anomaly detection focuses on one feature (mobility) anomaly detection;
however, mobility is not the only feature. In ad hoc and mobile networks, there are
many crucial features, e.g., energy consumption, local computation, response time,
etc. Intrusions can occur in any of these features at any time. Also, due to the
system/network failure, the data we collected may not be always complete. Therefore,
the following questions arise: Can we detect anomaly in the testing data? Can we

detect anomaly in a specific feature? Can we detect anomaly if some data is missing?
In order to handle the interactions among multiple features and missing data, we
propose a Belief Network Based Anomaly Detection (BANBAD) technique.

1.3 Results
The MPB anomaly detection algorithm is effective for mobile networks. Each
node's normal mobility profile is modeled as a Multi-Leaf tree structure. Clusters,
generated through data mining, and the corresponding pattern strings, generated
through fuzzy logic, are the two fundamental elements of the Multi-Leaf tree
structure. Our MPB algorithm is then developed to detect potential masquerade
attacks. Simulation results demonstrate that our proposed algorithm can achieve
desirable performance in terms of both the false alarm rate and the detection rate for
nodes with regular movement behaviors through a fine tuning of the design parameter
- threshold. Efficient fine-tuning of this algorithm provides success and, subsequently,
a basis for better anomaly detection in all mobile networks.
BANBAD is an efficient anomaly detection technique which has the potential
to achieve high detection rates while reducing false alarm rates. It can be used to
detect anomaly in any feature. It is not restricted to using a specific feature such as the
mobility target feature for anomaly detection.
The key steps during the training process of BANBAD include analyzing raw
datasets, categorizing each feature, computing beliefs of features from all samples,
and finally extracting the belief range for the target feature. A normal profile is thus

generated. During the testing process, if the belief value of the target feature in a
sample is found to be outside its acceptable range, then an anomaly is detected,
otherwise, it is normal. To handle missing data in the testing sample, structure
learning techniques such as PC [29] are used to generate a belief network which helps
one to compute belief of the target feature using causal and diagnostic reasoning
(evidences) from other features.
The development of BANBAD significantly contributes to the field of
anomaly detection in a few ways. First, it describes a method of easily generating and
maintaining a profile. It achieves both high detection rate (^95%) and low false alarm
rate (<5%) for a chosen target feature, and false alarm rate can be bounded by certain
predefined threshold. It also has the potential to function with an incomplete sample
during the testing process. This function is useful in ad hoc networks, because its
dynamically changing topology can result in the incomplete observations for the
selected features. Moreover, BANBAD exhibits good performance for real datasets
derived from different networks. Finally, the BANBAD toolkit allows one to use it for
anomaly detection easily and effectively.

1.4 Dissertation Organization
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter II we review
related work. Chapter III describes mobility pattern based anomaly detection
algorithm for mobile networks. Chapter IV proposes centralized BANBAD algorithm
in detail as well as gives its overhead analysis. Chapter V presents the simulation
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results using synthetic datasets. Chapter VI presents the experimental results using
two real datasets. Chapter VII describes the software toolkit that implements
BANBAD. Chapter VIII concludes the dissertation with a brief discussion and
indications of future work.

CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK AND BACKGROUND

In this chapter, we review some of the most relevant previous work in the
intrusion prevention and detection areas of computers and network security.
The classifications of intrusion prevention and detection (IPDS) are given in
Figure 2.1.

IPDS

IPS

Types

n

HIPS

Techniques

IDS

Systems

Systems

Techniques

I
Signature
based

NIPS

±

Encryption

1

Anomaly
based

L HIDS
^

APIDS PIDS

Authentication

Snort

Untangle

Types

NIDS

OOSEC

Figure 2.1: Classifications of IDPS [66-67],

An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is a device that monitors network and/or
9

system activities for malicious or unwanted behavior and can react, in real-time, to
block or prevent those activities [66]; whereas an Intrusion detection system (IDS) is
software and/or hardware designed to detect unwanted attempts at accessing,
manipulating, and/or disabling computer systems, mainly through a network, such as
the Internet [67]. Where IDS (passive security solution) informs of a potential attack,
an IPS (active security solution) makes attempts to stop it.
From Figure 2.1, we observe that two main types are associated with IPS. A
host-based IPS (HIPS) is where the intrusion-prevention application is resident on
that specific IP address, usually on a single computer; where a network-based IPS
(NIPS) is one where the IPS application/hardware and any actions taken to prevent an
intrusion on a specific network host(s) is done from a host with another IP address on
the network. Two main techniques for IPS are: encryption and authentication. In
cryptography, encryption is the process of transforming information (referred to as
plaintext) using an algorithm (called cipher) to make it unreadable to anyone except
those possessing special knowledge, usually referred to as a key [68], Authentication
is the act of establishing or confirming something (or someone) as authentic, that is,
that claims made by or about the subject are true. This might involve confirming the
identity of a person, tracing the origins of an artifact, ensuring that a product is what
its packaging and labeling claims to be, or assuring that a computer program is a
trusted one [69].
From Figure 2.1, we observe also that four main types are associated with
IDS. A network-based IDS (NIDS) is an independent platform which identifies

intrusions by examining network traffic and monitors multiple hosts; a host-based
IDS (HIDS) consists of an agent on a host which identifies intrusions by analyzing
system calls, application logs, file-system modifications (binaries, password files,
databases) and other host activities and state; a protocol-based IDS (PIDS) consists of
a system or agent that would typically sit at the front end of a server, monitoring and
analyzing the communication protocol between a connected device (a user/PC or
system) and the server; and an application protocol-based IDS (APIDS) consists of a
system or agent that would typically sit within a group of servers, monitoring and
analyzing the communication on application specific protocols. Two main techniques
for IDS are: anomaly based and signature based. Anomaly based IDS establishes a
performance baseline based on normal network traffic evaluations. It will then sample
current network traffic activity to this baseline in order to detect whether or not it is
within baseline parameters. If the sampled traffic is outside baseline parameters an
alarm will be triggered; where in signature based IDS, network traffic is examined for
preconfigured and predetermined attack patterns known as signatures [67].
Some open source systems are shown on Figure 2.1, e.g., Snort [70] and
Untangle [71] are for both IPS and IDS, and OOSEC [72] is for IDS only.
Recall that IPS and IDS are two different solutions in that one is a passive
detection monitoring system and the other is an active prevention system. It would be
good that one evaluate a more mature IDS technology, and try the younger, less
established IPS solutions parallel. It is important to remember that no single security
device will stop all attacks all the time. IPS and IDS work best when integrated with
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additional and existing security solutions.

2.1 Intrusion Prevention Techniques
Data encryption and authentication are two primary methods, and play an
important role for intrusion prevention techniques. The basic idea behind such
techniques relies on key management. Li et al. propose a static key management
strategy, in which a key pre-distribution scheme is designed using the bivariate tdegree polynomial in a hexagonal coordinate system for the expected locations of the
sensor nodes [7]. By comparing with the square-based polynomial pre-distribution
scheme [9], the authors show that their scheme can improve the effectiveness of key
management in terms of the probability of key establishment, and can extract
appropriate security threshold with different polynomial degrees in sensor networks.
In addition to static key management scheme, another type of key management
scheme is the dynamic key management scheme in which keys can be updated
periodically or on demand as a response to node capture. By performing key update,
the compromised nodes are segregated and the network security can be enhanced. Li
et al. propose a group-based dynamic key management scheme in wireless sensor
networks without the requirement for a fixed infrastructure such as base stations and
cluster heads [10]. Their scheme ensures the network security without tampering the
compromised sensor nodes with an acceptable overhead, when A; = /, the overhead is
minimum where k is the number of key polynomials known to each node and / is the
number of polynomials unknown to each node.

Ma et al. propose an In Situ Pairwise Key (IPAK) bootstrapping algorithm for
shared-key establishment between neighboring sensors [11]. Two sensor types,
service sensors and worker sensors, are introduced. The simulation study shows their
work can achieve high key-sharing probability with low storage in worker sensors.
Ren et al. propose a location-aware multi-functional key management framework,
which ensures both node-to-sink and node-to-node authentication along report
forwarding routes, to guarantee end-to-end security in wireless sensor networks [12].
Recall that BANBAD is designed for detection and not prevention. We review
intrusion detection techniques next.

2.2 Intrusion Detection Techniques
Intrusion detection technique serves as the second line of defense, and is an
important component of the defense-in depth or layered network security mechanism.
The two main intrusion detection techniques are misuse detection and anomaly
detection. As to misuse detection techniques, Yang et al. propose a network misuse
detection mechanism based on traffic log, combining the payload independent traffic
classification technology [13]. Through observation and comparisons over extensive
experiments, the authors complete the selection of behavior features, and by using
collaborative learning method [14], they overcome the problems of both sample in
sufficiency and adaptability.
For anomaly detection techniques, Zhang et al. present an anomaly detection
technique in which each node locally analyzes available network data for anomalies.

Intrusion attempts are detected by employing a distributed cooperative mechanism in
which all participating nodes cast votes according to data they have previously
analyzed [3]. Results of this work are incomplete. First, trace data-feature or audit
data source-design is not complete. It is not clear what information a routing protocol
should include to make the IDS effective, Second, the detection model design does
not indicate when to initiate intrusion response. Finally, their technique suffers from
performance penalties and high false alarm rates.
Two main approaches exist in anomaly detection techniques: statistical-based
and rule-based. For rule-based approach, Silva et al. define multiple rules by taking
into account data messages in wireless sensor networks. These rules can be used to
determine if a specific type of network failure has occurred and to raise an intrusion
alarm if accumulative network failures exceed a predefined threshold [24]. Hilas
presents a rule-based expert system which aims to detect superimposed fraud cases in
the telecommunications network of a large organization [25]. The expert system
incorporates the network administrator's knowledge along with observations and
knowledge derived from the application of data mining techniques on historical data.
The knowledge is expressed in the form of rules implemented by C4.5 [26] algorithm
to classify calls into two classes, normal or anomaly.
For statistical-based approach, Sun el al. describe another technique by using
(a) the high-order Markov model to specify the mobility pattern of a user; (b) EWMA
(exponentially weighted moving average) for fading in order to maintain an updated
profile of each user; and (c) use distance, a metric for indicating how closely a mobile

user follows her routines [4]. As they themselves address, the algorithm has high false
alarm rates and low, dependent detection rates. Moreover, it is not easy to tell whether
an anomaly exists when the speed ranges of nodes are fairly low. Chatzigiannakis et
al. present a review and classification of data fusion algorithms [17], specifically
addressing the anomaly detection problem. By comparing two different representative
approaches, one based on the Dempster-Shafer Theory of Evidence [15], and the other
based on Principal Component Analysis [16], under different attack scenarios, they
identify which of these two approaches operates more efficiently, and could be used
to detect a wide range of attacks in an integrated way. However, the crucial
performance of anomaly detection, false alarm, rate and detection rate are not
exhibited in the paper. Liu et al. propose the insider attacker scheme [18]. By
exploiting the spatial correlation among networking behaviors of sensor in close
proximity, the scheme takes into consideration multiple attributes simultaneously
without requiring prior knowledge about normal or malicious sensor activities.
Li el al. propose the group-based anomaly detection scheme for wireless
sensor networks [19]. They use Mahalanobis distance measurement and the OGK
estimators [20] in the intrusion detection algorithm to consider of multiple attributes
(features) of the sensor nodes to detect malicious network attack behaviors. By
conducting real data [21] experiments and comparing with other intrusion detection
schemes of [18], lower false alarm rate and higher detection rate are achieved.
However, all the features are assumed to be normal distributed, and handling missing
or incomplete data is not clearly addressed.

Alves et al. propose two anomaly detection methods based on the concept of
profiles for detecting telecom fraud situations [22-23]. Some deficiencies are: first,
it's not clear how to efficiently extract the threshold; second, they argue the profile
should be always updated to avoid loss of information without considering the
possibility of introducing error due to profile update; third, no false alarm rate and
detection rate are demonstrated to evaluate the proposed methods.
Cai and Gupta propose an mobility-pattern-based anomaly detection algorithm
for mobile networks [30]. Data mining and fuzzy logic techniques are used to
generate a normal mobility profile during the training process, and to distinguish
abnormal mobility patterns from normal ones. Good performance is achieved by
efficiently tuning the threshold by trial and error. However, only one feature mobility is considered in that paper.
In summary, for anomaly detection techniques, some work presents an IDS
framework without implementation detail [3]. Some methods only achieve good
performance when strong assumptions are met, like high velocity ranges [4-6]. Some
work does not demonstrate the crucial performance in terms of both false alarm rate
and detection rate [22-23, 25]. Some work [22-23] does not clearly specify how to
extract the threshold - crucial design parameter to achieve the good performance.
Some work considers only one target feature and limited datasets for testing [4, 19,
30]. In addition, most of the work does not clearly address how to handle the missing
data during the testing process and adaptive learning techniques, and sometimes
methods creating and updating dynamic profiles are very expensive [3], Our work,
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especially BANBAD, addresses all these deficiencies and gives the improvements.

2.3 Belief Networks
A belief network or directed acyclic graphical model is a probabilistic
graphical model [55, 75] that represents a set of random variables and their
conditional independencies via a directed acyclic graph (DAG). For example, a belief
network could represent the probabilistic relationships between diseases and
symptoms. Given symptoms, the network can be used to compute the probabilities of
the presence of various diseases.
In belief networks, edges represent conditional dependencies; nodes which are
not connected represent variables which are conditionally independent of each other.
Efficient algorithms exist that perform inference and learning in belief networks.
Bayesian networks are used for modeling knowledge in computational biology
and bioinformatics (gene regulatory networks, protein structure, gene expression
analysis [56]), medicine [57], document classification, information retrieval [58],
image processing, data fusion, decision support systems, engineering, gaming and law
[59-61].

2.4 Structure Learning Techniques
Automatically learning the graph structure of a belief network is a challenge
topic within machine learning. The problem of leaning network topology, however, is
NP hard. We introduce two main structure learning techniques: K2 and PC.

K2 algorithm is a commonly used greedy search algorithm in belief structure
learning. The performance of the K2 algorithm is greatly affected by the order of input
nodes. If all parents in the node ordering occur prior to their children in the node
ordering, the algorithm will perform optimally and consequently the results are very
accurate [28]. The K2 algorithm is very efficient as the node-ordering information
reduces the search space of DAG, thus making the search non-exhaustive. However,
the performance of the algorithm may be poor when using wrong orderings in which
most children nodes appear prior to their parents and for orderings that are random in
nature. Unfortunately, in most cases, the input node ordering is usually unknown.
Another well-cited structure learning algorithm is PC algorithm [29] based on
independence test. The basic hypothesis of PC algorithm is: the independence
relationships have a perfect representation by DAG; we have a very large database;
and statistical tests have no error. Under these conditions, the algorithm will discover
and equivalent belief network. Computing p-value usually used to determine whether
there is independence for two variables. However, sometimes the direction of links
needs to be solved with user interaction to keep the DAG structure because PC
algorithm can not necessarily finish complete arc orientation. Due to we have very
large dataset, therefore, we apply PC algorithm mainly in our BANBAD work.

CHAPTER III
ANOMALY DETECTION FOR MOBILE NETWORKS

3.1 Model Description
3.1.1

Network model

As clusters and patterns are used a coordinate system can also be used
to define our network model. The network is modeled as a generalized graph G = (V,
E). The vertex set V represents the set of clusters. Edge set E represents all the edges.
If two clusters have a parent-child relationship, there exist several (at least one) edges
(pattern strings) between the two.

3.1.2

Mobility model

We exclude the scenario that a node has totally random movement
behavior and hence we do not consider the random walk model [62] in which the
node will move to any one of the adjacent cells with equal probability after leaving a
cell. In reality, random walk occurs very rarely, if at all. Further, one should capitalize
on the most common and frequent occurrences. We assume that each node normally
traverses with a destination in mind and the normal mobility profile of a node can be
represented by a Multi-Leaf tree structure to capture the node movement. Each
19
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possible route can be represented by a sequence of symbols C\, C\\, C514...where C
stands for the cluster and the subscripts indicate the hops. For instance, C584 refers to
the cluster on the third tree level which passed from the fifth cluster of the first hop,
via the eighth cluster of the second hop, to the destination cluster which is the fourth
cluster of the third hop.

3.2 MPB Anomaly Detection Algorithm
3.2.1

Pattern definition

We use the combination of velocity and direction to represent the
mobility pattern of nodes within any 1 hop by:
P = V*a Where Ve[0,V max J

, (2 E[0,2;T]

, and Vmax is the maximum

possible velocity.
Therefore, any route can be represented as the sequence of P elements
depending on the hops. For instance, three hops route can be represented as

PQP\PI

or(FoA«o)(KiAai)(K2Aa3).

3.2.2

Data mining and fuzzy logic approaches

In this subsection, data mining [63] and fuzzy logic [64] techniques we
use for solving the challenging problem (See chapter I) of handling many closer
points and look-alike mobility patterns are discussed.
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Cluster Classification Algorithm:
Input: Destination points dataset D, # of representatives K.
Output: A set of clusters Q , . . . ,Q.
1: randomly select a point p to form a new cluster;
2: for each new cluster rj do
for each current cluster Cdo
calculate average distance (C, p);
assign pto rjor Cbased on distance measure;
3: update the profiles of newly formed clusters;
4: repeat Lines 1-3 until no new cluster are added;
5: return

Figure 3.1: Cluster classification algorithm.

Figure 3.1 is the pseudo code of the cluster classification algorithm,
originated from data mining techniques, which is used in both training and testing
processes in order to generate the corresponding clusters or detect anomaly by
collecting certain points through the 'distance' measurement.
We use the following example to show how fuzzy logic techniques are
applied in our MPB algorithm. By the normalized membership function (l-x/n), one
can ascertain how "close" the current velocity is to the designated velocity. Here, x is
the difference between current velocity and designated velocity, and n is the
predefined maximum velocity. Suppose 3.25 and 3.251 are the two current velocities
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and 4 is the designated velocity. We would then have

(1-(4-3.251)/H)>(1-(4-3.25)/«)

implying that 3.251 is closer to 4 than 3.25. Therefore, by applying fuzzy logic
techniques, we can mine data smoothly during the training process and distinguish the
subtle difference during the testing process.

3.2.3

The distance measure

We introduce two thresholds, Cthr and P(hn which are the design
parameters for creating new clusters and pattern strings, respectively.
In the training process, we compare Q/,f and/or Pthr with the distance
among the points calculated using data mining and fuzzy logic techniques and decide
to add new clusters and/or new pattern strings for an existing cluster.
In the testing process, still based on the calculated distance, we decide
whether there exists an anomaly. More specifically, when distance (Cx)5Ctiir and
distance (Py)^Pthr, the route with destination point P is evaluated as normal, otherwise
the route is identified as an anomaly.

3.2.4

Multi-leaf tree structure

We use Multi-Leaf tree structure to model the normal mobility profile
of nodes, consider the example of Figure 3.2 which depicts a typical mobility profile
associated with a specific node.
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Figure 3.2: Multi-leaf tree structure.

Such a Multi-Leaf tree structure is generated by data mining techniques
for creating clusters and fuzzy logic techniques for creating the corresponding set of
pattern strings of each cluster.
•

The root, starting cluster, is composed of a group of points that are
within CW distance of each other, where Cthr is the threshold of
cluster;

•

The first-level nodes, such as C\, C?_, and Cm are the distinct
destination cluster nodes which we've collected after certain time
periods;

•

C\\ and Cin are the two possible children cluster nodes whose
parent cluster node is C\, that is, staring from C\, after certain time
periods, there exists two possible subsequent distinct destination
cluster nodes;

•

Cin is generated #f(Vxe[l,rc-l]),3(Ci*<CW)where C\x is the cluster
distance of point P; similarly, the nth pattern string associated with
Cin is generated iff(\/ye\l,n~\]),3(Py<P,i,r)where Py is the pattern
string distance of point P and P,>,r is the threshold of pattern strings.

•

The rectangle box attached

to each cluster

specifies the

corresponding set of pattern strings. For each pattern string, we
have the information of both the pattern distributions and pattern
orders;
•

This process is continued until we get to the final level destination
clusters which are the leaf nodes of Multi-Leaf structure. Note that
all of the above information can be gathered by data mining and
fuzzy logic techniques using algorithms similar to the one of Fig.2.

3.2.5

The fram ework

The general framework of our proposed MPB anomaly detection
algorithm is given in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3: General framework of MPB anomaly detection algorithm.

The purpose for the training process is to generate and maintain an upto-date normal mobility profile for any specific node, and by comparing the distance
metric of the testing data with that of the current profile, we can distinguish whether
testing data is an anomaly.

3.2.6

Overhead of MPB anomaly detection algorithm

Let us consider the following general case. Note that we assume all
training and testing data are collected using the same hops starting from the same
starting cluster.
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Suppose we have a partial 2-level Multi-Leaf tree structure composed of the
starting root cluster and k first level destination clusters. There are n hops from the
root to the first level destination clusters. For each of the first level destination
clusters, there are m pattern strings specifying every possible route from the root.
Here, m is a variable since it's possible for m to be different for different first level
destination clusters. Let iV be the total number of points for constructing such partial
2-level Multi-Leaf tree structure.
Let P(x, y) be a point with P\Pi_-- -Pn as the pattern string. We integrate P into
the Multi-Leaf tree structure as follows.
For training process: In the first step, we need to determine distances from P
to every other point resulting in N distance calculations; In the second step, for each
cluster, average cluster distance from. P needs to be computed. Therefore, we have k
average distance calculations; In the third step, we need to get the minimum average
cluster distance (MinACD); In the fourth step, we need to compare MinACD with Ctiir
and determine whether a new cluster needs to be introduced.
1. If {MinACD > CW ), add (k+]fl cluster associated with its mobility
pattern string P\P2.. .P„- DONE.
2.

Else, select the cluster which has the MinACD, say, C.

2.1)we compute a total of m distances of P from the m pattern strings of C;
2.2)we compute n average pattern strings distance of P from, the n hops of C;
2.3)determine the minimum average pattern strings distance (MinAPSD);
2A)lf(MinAPSD > Pthr), add (m+lf pattern string, that is, P{P2,, .Pn to C. DONE.
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It's now clear that if the MPB algorithm stops in step 1, then the overhead is
0(N + 2k) whereas if the algorithm quits in step 2.4, the overhead isO(N + 2k + 3m).
For testing process: we just need to decide whether point P is an anomaly.
Same steps are used in the training process, the only difference being instead of
DONE in step 1 and 2.4, we generate an ALERT.
Therefore, the overall overhead of the MPB algorithm isO(N + 2k + 3m).

3.3 Simulation Results
Without loss in generality, we generate a typical normal mobility profile
which accounts for the regular mobility patterns of a specific node. Such data sets are
obtained using statistical methods. Ten thousand records are generated with random
velocity and degree, where velocity e[1,8] and degree &[Q,2n] . All values are of type
double.
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Figure 3.4: A specific route (Ct—>Cj;—>C| 11) of three hops after the training process.

A Multi-Leaf tree structure with three hops is acquired by data mining
techniques, more specifically, cluster classification algorithm in Figure 3.1. After this
process, we have eight clusters as the first level destination clusters, seven clusters as
the second level destination clusters and just one - Cm as the third level destination
cluster. A specific route (Ci—>Cn—>C\\\) connected with the corresponding points,
i.e., />, (2.17, 4.92) -~+P2 (4.84, 1.64) -> P3 (7.93, 1.28) is shown in Figure 3.4.
Note that the mobility profile we generated is general, and typical for most
nodes. It may not be suitable for nodes with totally random movement behaviors, but
recall that totally random model is out of the scope of this dissertation.
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False alarm rate and detection rate are selected as the performance metrics for
our proposed algorithm [7-9].
1. Cthr = 5.0 and P{u ~ 0.6: The false alarm rate and detection rate are plotted
in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Performance at different velocity ranges.

Figure 3.5 demonstrates that the detection rate is fairly high and the false
alarm rate is fairly low. Unlike the results of Sun et al., whose performance was
dependent on the velocity ranges, this MPB algorithm achieves good detection rate
(90%) and false alarm rate (8%) for all ranges of velocity.
Good performance is achieved when Ptiu = 0.6. Given, say Ctiir = 5.0, naturally
the question of whether Pthr can be determined arises. Since velocity 3 and 4 are
crucial for the performance (from Figure 3.5, they achieve worst performance for both
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the detection rate and the false alarm rate), we use these 2 velocity ranges for further
testing.
Fixed Pthr
1 oo 60 -I
'Detection Rate (Velocity A}
•Detection Rate (Velocity 3> ;
-False Alarm Rate (Velocity 3) {
-Fatse Alarm Rate £ Velocity 4 } ;

I

£
B
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4020-

O-l
0,2
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0,$

0,7
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Figure 3.6: Fixed mobility pattern threshold.

2. Ptf,r is decidable: From Figure 3.6, we observe that /\i lr can be efficiently
determined. The detection rate is increased during the range of Pt[)T from 0.2 to 0.7,
but the corresponding false alarm rate is 0% when Pl[tr ^ 0.4, theoretically, it's
impossible. And although detection rate becomes better when /Jtiir = 0.7, the
corresponding false alarm rate also increases, to the rate of almost 30%, this is also
not acceptable. Therefore, selecting the value of Pt\lx around 0.6 might be the ideal
value for performance in terms of both the false alarm rate and the detection rate
given certain Cuir (here, CW - 5.0). After testing for Px\v = 0.59, 0.6 and 0.61,
respectively, our selection has been confirmed, that is, once .Pthr is around 0.6, the
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good performance of both detection rate and false alarm rate is achieved. Thus, we
can say that value of Pt|ir can be efficiently determined for a given Qur, note that the
whole process to determine Pthr is adjusted by trial and error.

CHAPTER IV
CENTRALIZED BANBAD ANOMALY DETECTION ALGORITHM

The basic idea of BANBAD during the training process includes analyzing
raw datasets, categorizing each feature, computing beliefs of features from all
samples, and finally extracting the belief range for the target feature. A normal profile
is thus generated. During the testing process, if the belief value of the target feature in
a sample is found to be outside its acceptable range, then an anomaly is detected,
otherwise, it is normal. To handle missing data in the testing sample, structure
learning techniques such as PC [29] are used to generate a belief network which helps
one to compute belief of the target feature using causal and diagnostic reasoning
(evidences) from other features.

4.1 Assumptions
First, we assume there is a secure station in the ad hoc network which
maintains normal profiles of nodes by executing the training process. The secure
station is also in charge of detecting anomaly by executing the testing process.
Assuming an existence of a secure station to monitor security policies is reasonable
and justified because one has to place or build trust in a node (or set of nodes).
Furthermore, our focus in this dissertation is to show the viability, power and
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efficiency of anomaly detection technique using Belief Networks (BNs) and Bayesian
statistics. Naturally, BANBAD can be extended to a distributed case, however, that is
out of the scope of this dissertation and left as a future work. The centralized
approach simplifies the discussion without compromising its usefulness. The
communication between nodes and secure station is considered reliable.
Second, we assume each node has a specific behavior database which
describes its normal activities. All node behavior databases are stored in a secure
place which is hard to be compromised. There exists at least one device inside each
mobile node which can provide the accurate behavior of the node at any time. Even if
an attacker uses the captured node, he still does not know how to manipulate such
device which is inside the node.
Third, we assume nodes have fairly regular behaviors. Therefore, it is viable to
create the normal profile for each node. We assume normal profile generated by
perfect data which follows normal routine and exclude totally random behavior by a
node. Indeed, based on belief networks and the probability distributions we described
in next section, such normal profile can be generated under any appropriate scenario
as long as normal behavior exists during a certain time period, and. this is not limited
to ad hoc networks. Therefore, BANBAD is also applicable to other networks.
Finally, our current focus is to simply show the applicability of BANBAD in
anomaly detection with bounded false alarm rate under very relaxed assumptions and
not to limit its applicability to any specific type of networks. Hence, our discussion
does not entail exploitation of various specific features of ad hoc networks. Moreover,

34
the features selection process is out of the scope of this dissertation; our examples
illustrate few viable features and are by no means exhaustive. However, based on
certain techniques such as structure learning [28-29], we can test if the selected
features are associated or not.

4.2 Belief Networks and BANBAD Preliminaries
Recall that a Belief Network (BN) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) in which
nodes represent variables, or features; and arcs represent the nature of dependence
among the features and the conditional probabilities.
In a hypothetical arc from feature A to feature B, A is the parent of B. B
depends directly on A. All other local probability distributions are conditional. If a
feature is observable, the feature is an evidence feature.
Now, consider a BN that is used to detect anomalies in an ad hoc network.
Suppose energy consumption of a node is related to average velocity, displacement,
and some other features. The dependencies among these features can be represented,
in a simplified scenario, for example, by a chain model as in Figure 4.1.
Average
Velocity

\ ^ / D /
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s o / a C

e

\ f e /
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Figure 4.1: The chain application model displaying the dependencies of various
features of a node.

As Figure 4.1 shows, energy consumption is affected by Displacement (D) and
it affects Response Time (R). Note that in this example, for brevity, we do not display
all factors that may affect energy consumption (£). The continuous raw dataset in a
BN is categorized based on some characteristic features. For example, Average
Velocity

(V)

may

be

partitioned

into

two

states

{Ki,K2}

where

V\ = \vmw,v\) and F2 = rvi,vm(«] . Similarly, there are two states [D\,Di) for
Displacement (D), where D\ s \dnm, d\) and Di s ldi,dmax]; three states {£1, £2, £3} for
Energy Consumption (E), where E\ = [e«,„,ei), is?, = [e\,ei) , and £3 s [e2,<?m«.v]; and
three states {/?i,/?2,/?s) for Response Time (7?), where 7?i E=[Vm/»,n) , /?2 5 [ n , n ) ,
and R^s^r

2, rma.x].

To illustrate BANBAD, we use energy consumption (E) with 3 states as our
target feature. We detect anomalies, say, for the first state E\ of E as:
Case I: A complete testing sample for E exists. We can compute the
probabilities of the three states during the training process. For example, during a
certain time period, we observe the probability vector {0.7, 0.1, 0.2} where 0.7, 0.1
and 0.2 are the probabilities of E\, £2, and £3, respectively. Here, 0.7 is the causal
reasoning [27] of E\ (probability inferred from the parent node, D, that E\ occurs),
referred to as^(£i), i.e., there is 70% chance that E\ occurs in the training dataset
available to us. Let us now assume that we obtain two probability vectors {0.5, 0.2,
0.3} and {0.65, 0.21, 0.14} for E within the same time period from two different

testing data. The next step, naturally, is to evaluate the differences between the
training data and the two testing data.
The Belief (Bel) vector for E can now be computed using Bayes' rule1. It is a
good metric for anomaly detection since it is assigned when the relevant evidence is
taken into account. It combines causal reasoning and diagnostic reasoning, where
diagnostic reasoning of E\ is the probability inferred from the child node, R, that E\
occurs, referred to asA(£i). Here, R is a childless node, and initially we arbitrarily
set A(Ri)=1.0.
Continuing with the numerical example, we can compute the diagnostic
reasoning

of

E]

given

R

in

the

training

data

to

be

1

by

applyingX(E\) = ]T X(R>) * P(E\ \ Ri), i.e., 1{E\_,«™%.) = 1.0, P(E\ \ Ri) is the probability
that E\ occurs given R,. Then, we obtain Bel(E\_m,mmS) = 0.7 . Since we have complete
datasets for E and to account for several training samples, we can use
A(Ei_)

= 7t(E,

j/x(Ei_.traminl!)

(1)

Ej_ refers to individual training or testing sample and 7r(£o™,™s) refers to the
weighted mean of all causal reasoning values of £/_™™ns . Thus, the diagnostic
reasoning of the two testing data are i(E\

respectively. So, ge/(£,_,,,,nKl) =

T

«.,»,,,;0 = —- and X(E\ W^J) = ——,
"
0.7
0.7

( £ l - ^ | ) x ^ £ l - ^ ' ) _ a Q , 3 0 and Bel(Ej^«g2)*0.53 .

2^ Tt ( hi _ listing l ) x l ( t i _ lasting !)
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This implies that the first state, E\% of the second testing data {0.65, 0.21, 0.14} is
closer to the training data than the first testing data. With the design parameter
threshold r properly set, by comparing the difference of the belief between the training
and the testing data, we can distinguish whether the specific testing data is an
anomaly or not. Difference is denoted as distance and is discussed in detail in
subsection C. This case is relatively straightforward, since anomalies can be detected
easily given the existence of complete testing samples.
Case 2: A complete testing sample for E does not exist. The sample is
incomplete due to some missing information. A modification of BN techniques
allows us to detect anomalies.
To further explore how this is possible, first consider the belief propagation
algorithm, one of the exact Bayesian inference algorithms. Energy consumption (E) of
Figure 4.1 is still the target feature. Based on the belief propagation algorithm:
1) Bel(E) = an{E) • A(E) - Belief of energy consumption
2)

7i{E) =

n{D)°M{E\D)

3)

A(E) =

M{R\E)°A(R)

Where

• - term by term product of two vectors;
° - dot product of two vectors;
a - normalizing constant;

The belief propagation algorithm is used to update the belief of E given

Bel(Xi)

=

2 ] 7t(X,)x

A(X,)
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evidence from its related features. Once executed, its parent Displacement (£>)
transmits the causal reasoning (n message) and its child Response Time (R) transmits
the diagnostic reasoning (A message) to E for computing the belief of E.
Continuing with the example, the conditional probability distribution (CPD)
of E given D and CPD of R given E (equations (2) and (3)) allow the derivation of the
causal reasoning (4) and diagnostic reasoning (5) of the target feature (E).
jo.5
A//(El D) = \
|0.1

0.4 o.
0.3

(2)

0.6

0.2

0.4

0.4

M(R\E) = 0.3

0.3

0.4

0.6

0.1

0.3

w(^i) = 0.5«r(Di) + 0.U(£>2)

(3)

(4)

X(E\) = 0.2MRy) + OAMR2) + OAA(Ri)
7r(£i) depends directly on the causal reasoning of D, and A(£i) depends directly
on the diagnostic reasoning of R. Now, detection can proceed as in case 1, i.e., belief
can be computed to ascertain anomalies.
BNs allow us to learn causal relationship among features and handle
incomplete datasets easily [27]. Hence, with indirect belief computation which relies
on the evidence from other features, we can still detect anomaly.

4.3 The Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) Model
Figure 4.1 uses the chain model, a special case of the DAG model, to explain
how BNs are used for anomaly detection. A realistic and powerful DAG incorporates

(5)
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more features. This is necessary because energy consumption of a node, for example,
can be affected not only by its displacement but also by its local computation and
communication. Such a DAG model is displayed in Figure 4.2.

Figure 4.2: A more complete DAG application model representing the various factors
that affect energy consumption of a node.

4.4 Training and Testing Processes
The training process of BANBAD as depicted in Figure 4.3 first collects raw
data and features. Then, it applies structure learning techniques [28-29] to generate a
profile. Feedback (shown using dashed line) can be used to dynamically update the
profile. Note that the DAG structure may not be unique due to existence of multiple
samples. For simplicity, in this dissertation, we only consider a unique structure
generated by combining all the training samples. Using this process, it is easy to
maintain the profile over any time period.
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Figure 4.3: The training process of BANBAD.

The testing process (shown in Figure 4.4) consists of data and feature
collection and evidence extraction of features. If there is an incomplete data for a
target feature, BANBAD applies the belief propagation algorithm. By using
corresponding profile—generated during the training process within the same time
period, BANBAD computes the difference of the belief between the training and
testing data. A significant deviation (^threshold r ) indicates an. anomaly. The
difference is denoted as distance and is defined as
Distance(S) = \Behr (S) - BeL(S)\

(6)

S is a state of the target feature, BeL(S) is the belief of 5* in the training data,
and Behc(S) is the belief of S in the testing data. If Distance(S) <T , S is considered
normal, otherwise S is considered an anomaly.
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Figure 4.4: The testing process of BANBAD.

4.5 Range Settings
Each state of a feature has its own true (normal occurrence) and false (does
not occur) ranges, for example for D\,
[Q,7V(D>)
False

- £)\

K ( O i ) - £,7t(Di)
Trut

+ S

\(n{Ds)

+ S ,\~\

(7)

False

For some,?, o < e < l -7(0 o is the weighted mean of the causal reasoning of
the first state D\ of feature D when multiple training samples exist. n(D\)-s is the
lower bound of the true range of D\ and n{D\) + s is the upper bound of the true range
ofDi

From Figure 4.1, we observe that K{E) of the energy consumption depends
directly on the causal reasoning of D, and A(E) depends directly on the diagnostic
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reasoning of R. Using (1), the true range of the diagnostic reasoning of the first state
R] of feature R is:

__i—,,
n (R\)

+ = i—1
n (R i) _

(8)

and the false ranges of R\ are:

/z-(tfi)

and

f

\
1 + -=

•v

, H-co

(9)

*(*0

The true and false range settings above allow us to observe which evidences
we have at the beginning of the testing process.

4.6 Belief Computation
Recall that we compute Distance(S) = \Beh,\S)-~BeL(S)\

and compare it

with the threshold value, r , for anomaly detection. Thus, the crucial steps are the
belief computation from both the training and the testing datasets. Given the true and
false ranges of parent and children features, for brevity, let us discuss these steps
below using a chain model as in Figure 4.1. We consider only 3 features, namely
Displacement (D), Energy Consumption (E) and Response Time (R). We now assume
each feature has 4 states for clarity (rather than 2 states for D, 3 states for E and R).
Computing belief during the training process: We again assume that feature E
is the target feature for anomaly detection. Belief computation of feature E during the
training process is shown in Figure 4.5. There are 3 steps.
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Figure 4.5: Belief computation during the training process, n, Bel, A are ranges,
e.g.,7r(x/):[^~,^-] where 7r~(^A',)is the lower bound (upper bound) of the
causal reasoning ofxi.

Step 1: Causal reasoning (7T) computation: Given complete raw dataset, the
causal reasoning of each state of all the features can be observed. Let us say the causal
reasoning of state X\ is it*,, for 1 < / < 4, and X=D, E or R.
Individual training data just represents one sample and hence after constant
learning with multiple samples, a range around n* can be defined to account for
normal occurrence. This results in associating the range T/r;. , <!;]to the normal
occurrence of x,. Let N = total size of n samples. By applying the weighted rule,
—

-A — size

71 xi — /

7V xii

of

sample

j

(10)

we adapt our predefined range accordingly (i.e., weighted mean if sample
sizes are different). Hence, for each additional, sample (say nu) of training, the
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updated causal reasoning is simply
th

n

sample
N

size

lh

size

of

(«-.l)
N

samples
{

U

All the conditional probability distributions (CPDs) are computed as well, for
example, the updated P(E \ D) is
th

n

sample size

size of
P(E | D\n ) ^
1h

(n — 1) samples
:

P(E | DXn-\)

(U\

and used in the testing process. Note that CPDs are fairly stable since we
exclude totally random behavior. This way, we compute the entries of the n column in
Figure 4.5.
Step 2: Diagnostic reasoning (A) computation: To get the diagnostic range
of each feature, we map 1-1 from n to X as/U = ™- for each individual sample, 7r.«is
71 xi

the weighted mean of all 7r values of x,. The entries of the X column in Figure 4.5 are
thus completed.
Step 3: Belief computation: To get the belief of the target feature E and/or all
the features, we apply Bayes' rule as mentioned in subsection A. Multiple samples
lead the belief range to[#e/~ , Bel*! as shown in the belief column of Figure 4.5.
Computing belief during the testing process: When we have incomplete
testing sample, Bayesian inference algorithms need to be incorporated. This is shown
in Figure 4.6 that depicts the BANBAD testing process with missing data. The basic
idea is to update the range of the causal and diagnostic reasoning of the target feature
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in a number of iterations. Each iteration partially fills the gap created from the
missing data.
1: iteration = 1;
2: anomaly = false;
3: Compute the ranges[*--.

, *-;,.],[ar".

, <,],and[;v;

, A*.];

while (iteration < maxlterations && anomaly == false) {
Bayesian inference with n message passing from Dto target feature E;
if ( 3 / [ ^

, <] / / ; 7 e 5 n([/rg

, Kl^orfc

, <~]lmJ =

$){

anomaly = true;
break; }
9: else {
10:
Update ranges of n{E);
11:
12:

Compute/l(Zs)from 7 r ( / i ) ; }
Bayesian inference with n message passing from target feature Eto R;

13: if([^14:

, <.]n[A;. ,

K^t)

Update ranges of X{Ri);

15: Bayesian inference with A message passing from R to target feature E;
16: if(3/[A-.

, K]lineU^

,

^]/mel5=^){

17:
anomaly = true;
18:
break; }
19: else {
20:

Update ranges of X(E);

21:

Compute n{E) from A(E); }

22: Bayesian inference with A message passing from target feature Eto D;

23: ff([*24:

, ^,]n[Aj, , %,]*</>)

Update ranges of ?i{Di);

25:
iteration++;}
26: if (anomaly == true) generate alert;
27: else Compute belief of target feature E;

Figure 4.6: Testing process of BANBAD for the chain D —>E —> R.
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The policy for us to detect an anomaly is based on the target feature as a whole
instead of its individual states. Suppose the target feature has m states. Using the
training data, we compute the belief probabilities of these m states. In order to bound
the false alarm rate to 5%, the lower bound of each interval is set to the (5/m) lh
percentile and the upper bound is (100-5/m)' h percentile. Then, for a testing sample,
if the computed probabilities of all the states fall into their own normal (belief) range,
we conclude that there is no evidence of anomaly; otherwise, an anomaly is detected.
Overhead analysis of the chain model: Let r be the sample size observed in a
day, d be the number of days in the training data (replicates), / be the number of
features, and m be the maximum number of states in any feature. Note that parent and
children may not have the same number of states. The overhead to compute n is 0{r).
The worst case overhead in the remaining steps of the BANBAD training process
when chain model is used can be shown as:
O (m )

+

0 (m ' )

+ O (m d ) + O (m d )
~j

Update

K

Update
Step

C P D s

Step

w_

2

Step

(13)

I

The worst case overhead of the testing process when chain model is used can
similarly be derived as:
(

O (m)
n

&

X

+0(m')+

C or,i putation

inference
1

O(w)
range

) *

maxlterations

update

i Feral ion

In addition to the computation overhead, the worst case overhead of the
communication in the training and testing process are O(rfd) and 0(r/), respectively.

CHAPTER V
SIMULATION RESULTS OF CENTRALIZED BANBAD

BANBAD has been extensively tested under different scenarios. We
performed experiments that include testing both synthetic and real datasets. We
discuss these experimental results in this chapter and the next. As claimed earlier,
BANBAD's performance makes it a great candidate for anomaly detection. We
conducted 35 experiments under different scenarios to test the correctness, and
robustness of the centralized BANBAD.

5.1 Synthetic Datasets
For demonstrative purpose, we consider three scenarios. Scenario 1, the
features follow normal distribution with linear relationship among them; Scenario 2,
the features follow gamma distribution with linear relationship among them; and
Scenario 3, the features follow normal distribution with non-linear relationship among
them.

5.1.1

Normal distribution

We test our BANBAD technique using three different simulated datasets.
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These datasets consist of six features for 100 days (replicates). The dimension of each
dataset is r x 6 x 100, recall that r is the sample size observed in a day. We choose three
different values for r, namely 100, 1000, and 10000. Without loss in generality, we
assume that the first feature, / l follows normal distribution with mean,/./ = 30 and
variance, a2 = ( 2 0 / 3 ) ' ; other features /2 to /6 are generated using the following
scheme (we intend to have some linear relations among the features), Scheme 1:
/2: }/2xf] + S\
/ 3 : 2xf2 + 5i
f4: 3xf] + Si
/ 5 : l / 2 x / 4 + <?4

/ 6 : ]/3xf5

+ Ss,

where each & is independent and identically distributed (iid) standard normal
with mean 0 and variance 1.
After raw data generation, we categorize each feature using the scheme
described in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1: Categories of 6 features for Scheme 1

fl

n

<30
>=30

<15
>=15

/3
<25
[25, 35)
>=35

/4-»
<55
[55, 81)
[81,93)
[93, 99)
[99,115)
[115, 130)
>=130

'fs'.'" • / 6

<45
[45, 65)
>=65

<18
>=18
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From Table 5.1, we see that/I,/2, and/6 have two states;/? and/5 have three
states; and/4 has seven states. PC structure learning technique [29] is applied to six
categorical features obtained using the scheme described in Table 5.1. Figure 5.1 is
the profile structure learnt by PC. As we can see,/6 is the root which has no parent
node,/l is the leaf which has no child node. Feature/3 directly affects/l and f2, and
/3 is affected by/4,/5, and/6 directly.

i ft )

Figure 5.1: Structure of the profile learnt by PC.

To assess the performance, we conduct a detailed study of false alarm rate
(FAR) and detection rate (DR) for our proposed anomaly detection algorithm.
To evaluate FAR, three separate testing datasets Dl, D2, and D3 with
dimension 1000, 2000 and 5000, respectively are generated for 100 replicates. (Di}'
is denoted as the j ' h (1 < / < 3,1 <j< 100) replicate of dataset Di. We keep the same
distributional scheme as in the training data described earlier. On the other hand, to

evaluate the DR, three different testing datasets D4, D5, and D6 each with dimension
1000, 2000, and 5000 are generated for 100 replicates. (Di)J again denotes as
the j'h(4 < i < 6,1 < j < 100) replicate of dataset Di .We intentionally use a different
distribution for /lfor each dataset, to make it different from the training data. For
other features, we keep the same linearly dependent structure as described in Scheme
1. Comparing the normal profile (i.e., the training dataset) with each of the replicates
(£>/,l</<3) separately, when the estimated state probabilities of the replicate falls
outside the normal range, then it is a false alarmed scenario. Hence, if a replicates out
of 100 have a belief probability outside the normal range, then the false alarm rate
(X

is

= a% ; similarly, comparing the normal profile

with replicates of

dataset (Di, 4 < /' < 6) separately, if the belief value falls inside the normal range, then
miss-detection rate is fi% leading to a detection rate of (100-/?)% . Note that during
this evaluation process, single replicate is to be compared with the training data at a
time.
The FAR and DR are plotted in Figure 5.2 for all features for the training
dataset of dimension 1000 and the evaluation dataset of dimension 5000.
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Figure 5.2: False alarm rate and detection rate for all features (normal distribution).
Note: All detection rate lines overlap.

Recall the decision rule addressed in Chapter IV, our anomaly detection
technique is based on the feature as a whole rather than its individual states. Based on
our testing environment settings mentioned before, the dataset of ju = 30 is used for
testing the FAR. From Figure 5.2, we observe the FAR of all features to be almost 0%
which indicates all belief values of all states fall into their own. normal ranges. The
datasets with mean ju = 18,27,33,42 are used for testing the DR. From Figure 5.2, we
observe that DR of all the features is almost 100% which indicates at least 1 belief
value of any state falls outside of its normal range.
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Results of Figure 5.2 validate our BANBAD technique for anomaly detection
using all the features in our decision. Now let us assume feature 4 to be the target
feature. We explore the FAR and DR in more detail for individual states of feature 4
which are plotted in Figure 5.3 and 5.4. The training dataset used is of 1000
dimension; similar results were obtained when normal profile of other dimensions
were used.
D1 (dimension - 1000)
D2 (dimension = 2000)
D3 (dimension = 5000)

2.0 A

1.54

1.0 4

<
u.

0.5

0.0
_T—,—]
,—_T_
3
4
5
State of feature 4

6

Figure 5.3: False alarm rate of feature 4.

We set the maximum value of probability of Type-I error at 2%. In statistics,
the term Type I error, also called a error or false positive is used to describe possible
errors made in a statistical decision process [76]. Plainly speaking, it occurs when we
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are observing a difference when in truth there is none. This is false alarm rate in our
case. Feature 4 has 7 states, then the lower bound of a 98% belief range is 1st
percentile and the upper bound is 99 n percentile. From Figure 5.3, we observe that the
FAR of all the states of feature 4 for dataset Dl and D2 is between 0 and 2%. For
dataset D3, it is very close to 0%. Clearly, this implies that BANBAD performs as
expected, i.e., one can bound the FAR to a predefined percentage and it is stable.

State of Feature 4

Figure 5.4: Detection rate of feature 4.

Figure 5.4 shows the detection rate for various states of feature 4 using
/4 = 42 and training dataset of dimension 1000 with predefined 5% bound on FAR.
Recall that D4, D5, and D6 with dimension 1000, 2000, and 5000 each were designed
to be anomaly. In fact, the DR is at least 95%. We can see an excellent performance
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for most states except state 2 which appears to show somewhat of an erratic behavior.
This erratic behavior can be explained due to the way categorization of raw data in the
training dataset occurs. The categorization affects the probability distribution of a
feature and DR depends on this underlying distribution. In practice, one has little
control over the categorization.
1 00 j
98 -j
96-j
j

94 J
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£ 90-j
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000)1.
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FAR percentiles for State 2 of Feature 4

Figure 5.5: FAR bound versus DR for State 2 of feature 4.

However, given a categorization, one can fine tune the threshold, by adjusting
the bound on FAR. For example, if the bound for state 2 of feature 4 is changed to
20% (i.e., belief values between percentiles 10 and 90 are considered normal range),
the DR can be improved. Figure 5.5 shows the effect of varying the bound on FAR on
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the observed DR for state 2 of feature 4. Note that DR can be improved with good
performance to 98%. This shows that BANBAD has the potential to detect anomaly
even for a specific state of a feature.
From Figure 5.3 and 5.4, we observe that the performance becomes better
when the dimension is increased, from Dl to D3, and from D4 to D6; more the data
we can collect, better the performance. Obviously, this is as expected.
In summary, although we used normal distribution with specific^ and crto
show the FAR and DR performance of BANBAD, similar performance can be
expected for other values of ju and a or other probability distributions of raw data.
The next section considers some of these scenarios. As mentioned above, using the
percentile technique applied in a manner similar to the normal distributional features,
we can always bound the FAR to a. predefined percentage; and by fine tuning the
percentile for some specific states if necessary, we can also achieve high DR for all
situations.

5.1.2

Gamma distribution

After testing symmetry distribution, like normal distribution, we test a nonsymmetric distribution, gamma distribution. Feature f[ of normal profile is generated
by a and [i where a x fi = 30 andax/j" = —

. Similarly, feature f\ of anomaly is

V 3 )

i 20^

generated by a and fi where a xfj = 18, 27, 33 or 42 a n d « x / ? = |

J

2

. Other
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features fl to f6 are generated using scheme 1. Feature 4 is the target feature for
anomaly detection. The FAR and DR are plotted in Figure 5.6 for all the features.
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Figure 5.6: False alarm rate and detection rate for all features (gamma distribution).

We categorize feature 4 by setting 3 states. Uniformly distributed (ud) forms
the same state interval, and skewed distributed (sd) forms different state interval.
Form Figure 5.6, we observe FAR of all features to be almost 0%, while the DR of all
features to be almost 100%.

5.1.3

Non-linear relationship features

In this study, datasets with features having a non-linear relationship are tested
as follows. We assume that the first feature, /l follows normal distribution with
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mean,/./ = 30 and variance, a2

20

other features /2 to / 6 are generated using

the following scheme, Scheme 2:
f2:

\/2xf\ + S\

fl:

2xf2 + Si

/ 4 : fixf3

+S3

f5 : l / 2 x / 4 + 54
/ 6 : l/3x/5 + ^5,
where each*?/ is iid standard normal (mean 0 and variance 1).
Feature 4 is the target feature for anomaly detection. The FAR and DR are
plotted in Figure 5.7 for all the features.
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Figure 5.7: False alarm rate and detection rate for all features having non-linear
relationship.
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We categorize feature 4 by setting 3 states. Uniformly distributed (ud) forms
the same state interval, and skewed distributed (sd) forms different state interval.
Form Figure 5.7, we observe the FAR. of all features to be almost 0%, while the DR
of all features to be almost 100%.

5.2 Effect of Categorization
From subsection 5.1, recall that FAR can be bounded, by a predefined
threshold; however, DR is not "very good" for detecting anomaly in individual states.
Effect of categorization of feature 4 is plotted in Figure 5.8. We use scheme 1 here.
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Figure 5.8: Effect of categorization of feature 4.

From Figure 5.8, we observe that the DR. for discrete states is unstable for
BANBAD. Figure 5.9 is plotted to further explain such phenomenon. Scheme 2 is
used as an example for feature 4.
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Figure 5.9: A reason that BANBAD is not applicable for anomaly detection for
individual states.

Based on the histogram plotted in Figure 5.9, we observe that there is an
obvious probability distribution difference between the training and testing dataset for
the value range from 0 to 1300. This indicates that we can detect anomaly with good
performance for that state if it is set within this range. On the contrary, for the value
range from 1300 to 1800, the training and testing dataset are almost overlapped which
indicates that anomaly would be miss-detected (i.e., not detected) if the state is set
within that range. In fact, one has little control over the categorization because
probability distribution can be any value range in the real world, and different
probability distributions of the testing dataset have different overlapped ranges with
that of the training dataset. That's why BANBAD is not applicable for anomaly
detection for any individual state, and is applicable to features as a whole.

CHAPTER VI
BANBAD PERFORMANCE ON REAL DATASETS

We tested BANBAD for two datasets collected from specific ad hoc networks
and those are discussed in this chapter.

6.1 Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
The dataset is taken from Intel Lab Data [21]. Data is collected by 54 sensors
deployed in the Intel Berkeley Research Lab between February 28lh and April 5l
2004. Four features are selected and sensors collect data for temperature, humidity,
light, and voltage once every 31 seconds. From this raw dataset, we select a whole
month (March) data for testing a sensor's behavior, e.g., sensor 2. Light is the target
feature for anomaly detection. The data collected around midnight everyday are used
for training to generate a normal profile and testing FAR, and the data collected after
8am everyday are used for testing DR.
After some raw data manipulation, we have the range [min, max) of all 4
features of WSN as shown in Table 6.1.
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Table 6.1: Range of 4 features of WSN
Temperature
ri8. 123)

Humidity
r-4, 50)

Light | Voltage .
[0, 626)
[2, 3)

By default, we use the following categorization scheme for 3 states:
Maximum value for state 1 is: (max - min)x 0.25 + min
Maximum value for state 2 is: (max-min )x0.75 + min,
Therefore, we have the categories of 4 features of WSN as shown in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Categories of 4 features of WSN
Temperature
<51.25
[51.25,96.75)
>=96.75

Humidity
<9.5
[9.5, 36.5)
>=36.5

Light
<156.25
[156.25,469.5)
>=469.5

Voltage
<2.25
[2.25, 2.75)
>=2.75

By applying BANBAD, we obtain the following results as shown in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3: Anomaly sample # and performance of WSN

Anomaly sample #

M^Sl llliSli
28
19
3.45% 96.55%

When we check anomaly sample #28, we find that some values of the light
value are too high which indicates that there is an anomaly during the midnight; and
when we check anomaly sample #19, we find that some values of the light value are
too low which indicates that there is an anomaly during the morning. Here, real
dataset does demonstrate normal behavior during certain time period; therefore, we
intentionally select our target feature, light, between two different time periods,
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around midnight and after 8am from a sensor, for anomaly detection. From Table 6.3,
we observe that BANBAD exhibits excellent performance, in terms of both the false
alarm rate and detection rate, for wireless sensor network.

6.2 Wireless Network (WN)
This dataset is taken from UMASS Trace Repository [73]. The data is
collected for 60 laptop users to show their battery usage. From the raw dataset, six
features are selected for our anomaly detection experiment. They are:
a) Battery capacity remaining (BCR)
b) Whether the machine was on AC or not (AC)
c)

CPU utilization (CPU)

d) What was the disk space available (in MB) in the user account (DSA)
e) Whether the machine had Internet connectivity (INTERNET)
f)

What was the time since there was a keyboard event (idle time) in milliseconds
(IDLE),
BANBAD is selected to test a user's normal behavior, e.g., idle time for user

#59. Our purpose is to demonstrate that a specific user has different idle time between
different time periods. As such feature f) IDLE is our target feature for anomaly
detection. The data collected around midnight from Sunday to Thursday are used for
training to generate a normal profile and testing FAR, and the data collected after 2pm
from Monday to Friday are used for testing DR.
After some raw data manipulation, we have the range [min, max) of all 6
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features of WN as shown in Table 6.4.
Table 6.4: Range of 6 features of WN
:BCR
[64,100)

AC
[0,1)

CPU i
DSA
INTERNET
[0,95.31) [55068,69871)
[0, 1)

IDLE
[0, 438402657)

By using the default categorization scheme defined, in WSN subsection for 3
states, we have the categories of 6 features of WN as shown in Table 6.5.
Table 6.5: Categories of 6 features of WN
BCR
<73

AC
<0.25

CPU
<23.83

DSA
<58768.8

INTERNET
<0.25

[73,91)

[0.25, 0.75)

[23.83,71.48)

[58768.8, 66170.3)

[0.25, 0.75)

IDLE
<109600664,3
[109600664.3,

>=91

>=0.75

>=71.48

>=66170.3

>=0.75

328801992 8^
>=328801992.8

By applying BANBAD, we obtain the following results as shown in Table 6.6.
Table 6.6: Anomaly sample # and performance of WN

Anomaly sample #

I AR Li^:J.,..':'.l:..:.L.^'.'/: .o^^^^^^^^^B
N/A 1,2,4,6,7,9,10,11,12,13,16,19,20,21,22,24,25,26
0%
30.77%

From Table 6.6, we observe that DR is very low. By adjusting state 2 of
feature f) IDLE to [1096006.6, 328801992.8), we obtain the updated results as shown
in Table 6.7.
Table 6.7: Anomaly sample # and performance of WN

I'-AU
Anomaly sample #

•B91

]6
5
3.85% 96.15%

When we check anomaly sample #5, we find that some values of the idle time
are too small which indicates that there is an anomaly during the midnight; and when
we check anomaly sample #16, we find that some values of the idle time are too big
which indicates that there is an anomaly during the workday (Monday to Friday, after
2pm). From Table 6.7, we observe that we achieve good performance in terms of false
alarm rate and detection rate for the target feature, idle time, after adjusting
categorization, for wireless network. Recall that one has little control over the
categorization; therefore, it is not necessary to achieve good performance at once.
From both Table 6.3 and 6.7, we demonstrate that BANBAD is widely applicable
under different scenarios.
Known research results for IDS that use different types of systems and
networks with different assumptions and different real datasets typically have FAR
rates in the range [4%-6%] and DR rates in the range [90%-95%] [1.8-19], Compared
to those performances, our rates are slightly better.

CHAPTER VII
BANBAD TOOLKIT

7.1 Purpose
BANBAD toolkit is a console based software implementation of the
BANBAD technique developed in Microsoft-Windows environment for anomaly
detection. It is developed with few interactive steps to allow one to test any dataset
based on beliefs.

7.2 Organization
The general structure of the BANBAD toolkit is depicted in Figure 7.1.
raining process
(START)

C END 0
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Figure 7.1: General structure of the BANBAD toolkit.
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The general structure of BANBAD toolkit as shown in Figure 7.1 has two
interactive steps, module categorization and module structure learning. Since one has
little control over the categorization, therefore, interactive steps should be involved
for categorization module during the training process. As to structure learning, it is
out of the scope of this work, we simply use some existing, well-cited work for this
module.
Therefore, by applying top-down design strategy, we have the following
organization of BANBAD toolkit as shown in Figure 7.2.
BANBAD Toolkit
Dataset

Readme

Example
Dataset

Modules

Categorization

BANBAD
Software
1

BANBAD.BAT

Training
Process

Testing
Process

Training.BAT

Testing.BAT

Sample
Combiner

Belief
Computation

Usermanual

Modules

Belief
Computation

Categorization

Figure 7.2: Organization of the BANBAD toolkit.

The organization of BANBAD toolkit is depicted in Figure 7.2. Under
"BANBAD

Toolkit", the first level

includes "Dataset",

"exampleDataset",

"BANBAD Software", "readme.txt", "user-manual.doc", and "BANBAD.BAT".

"exampleDataset" includes "DatasetInfo.txt", and raw dataset for training and testing
processes, separately. "BANBAD Software" includes the modules of both the
"Training process" and "Testing Process", "readme.txt" specifies the essential
instructions for BANBAD toolkit to run, "user-manual.doc" gives the tutorial of how
to use BANBAD toolkit, and "BANBAD.BAT" is simply for starting the BANBAD
toolkit. Under "Training Process" module, we have three sub- modules for executing
different tasks, "Categorization", "Sample Combiner", and "Belief Computation";
similarly, under "Testing Process" module, we have two sub- modules for executing
different tasks, "Categorization" and "Belief Computation".

7.3 HW/SW Platforms
Currently, the BANBAD toolkit can be run on the MS-Windows platform and
all executable files are either ".bat" or ".exe". All modules under training and testing
processes are developed using visual C#, therefore we need MS Visual Studio 2008,
or at least a C# IDE for editing and compiling the source code.

7.4 Installation
For instance, we install the BANBAD toolkit on the windows desktop (we
assume "C" drive here, and the login name is "Administrator", e.g., "C:\Documents
and Settings\Administrator\Desktop\", we denote such desktop path as "PATH'''). We
generate a "BANBAD Toolkit" directory, and copy "Dataset", "exampleDataset",
"BANBAD Software", "readme.txt", "user-manual.doc", and BANBAD.BAT into it.
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Then we set the paths as follows;

In "BANBAD.bat", set the path as:
DirPath="Py4 77ABANBAD ToolkitV;
In "BANBAD Training.bat",
DirPath='7Mr/ABANBAD ToolkitV;
And In "BANBAD Testing.bat",
Desktop="PATH";
DirPath="/M r/AB ANBAD ToolkitV.

7.5 Main Functions/Classes of BANBAD Software
In "Categorization" class, we have "categorization" function as shown in
Figure 7.3.

Class:
Categorization
Function:
categorization
Parameters: int NumberOfFeatures, double[,] Range, int[]
NumberOfStates, double[„] States, doublet]
IntermediateState, int MaxNumberOfStates
Input:
number of features, range of each feature, maximum
number of states
Output:
number of states/upper bound of state of each feature

Figure 7.3: Function of "categorization".
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In "BeliefComputation" class, we have "causalReasoningComputation",
"diagnosticReasoningComputation", and "beliefComputation" functions as shown in
Figure 7.4 to 7.6.

Class:
BeliefComputation
Function:
causalReasoningComputation
Parameters: int NumberOfFeatures, int MaxNumberOfStates, int[J
NumberOfRows, int[] NumberOfStates, int[,]
CeliValues, int Sample, double[„] Pi, StreamWriter
PiRecord, StreamWriter EvaluatePiRecord, double[,]
TempPi, doublet,] Total, int targetFeature
Input:
number of features, maximum number of states,
sample size, number of states of each feature, current
sample
Output:
causal reasoning of the target feature

Figure 7.4: Function of "causalReasoningComputation".

Class;
BeliefComputation
Function:
disgnosticReasoningComputation
Parameters: int NumberOfSamples, int NumberOfFeatures, int[]
NumberOfStates, doublet,] Mean, double[„] Pi,
StreamWriter EvaluateLambdaRecord, double[,,]
Lambda, int targetFeature
Input:
number of features, maximum number of states,
sample size, number of states of each feature, current
sample
Output:
causal reasoning of the target feature

Figure 7.5: Function of "diagnosticReasoningComputation".
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Class:
BeliefComputation
Function:
beliefComputation
Parameters: in-t NumberOfSamples, int NumberOfFeatures, int[]
NumberOfStates, double[„] Pi, doublets] Lambda,
double[,] Sigma, double[„] Belief, StreamWriter
EvaluateBeliefRecord, int targetFeature
Input:
number of samples, number of features, number of
states of each feature, pi message, lambda message,
sigma message
Output:
belief of the target feature

Figure 7.6: Function of "beliefComputation".

7.6 Tutorial
Real dataset of wireless network (WN) in subsection 6.2 is used for tutorial,
feature 6 (IDLE time) is set to be the target feature for anomaly detection. We show
various steps for an example run below. Executed from "BANBAD.BAT",

72
Step 1: Window popup as shown in Figure 7.7, waiting for loading raw
training samples.
tfl C:\WINOOWS\system32\cmd.exe
."Start t r a i n i n g now, load raw dataset ( t r a i n i n g samples)"
{Press any key to continue . . .

Figure 7.7: Waiting for loading raw dataset.
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Step 2: After loading raw dataset, waiting for categorization as shown in
Figure 7.8.
m C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe
sample1H_serial txt
sample15_serial.txt
sample16_serial.txt
samplel7_serial.txt
samplel8_serial.txt
samplel9_serial.txt
samplel_serial.txt
sample20_serial.txt
sample21_serial.txt
sample22_serial.txt
sample23_serial.txt
sample24_serial.txt
sample25_serial.txt
sample2_serial.txt
sample3_serial.txt
sample4_serial.txt
sample5_serial.txt
sample6_serial.txt
ample7_serial.txt
sample8_serial.txt
sample9_serial.txt
26 file(s) copied.
Load raw dataset done, categorize training samples"
Press any key to continue . . .
<±_
_:
_ i
^
_ ! ' •••
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Figure 7.8: Waiting for categorization.
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Step 3: We categorize all features as shown in Figure 7.9 for setting the target
feature, states, and the threshold for FAR.

;m

m
Summary of Dataset:
8 of samples: 26
8 of features: 6
flax 8 of states: 18
Enter the target feature for anomaly d e t e c t i o n ( 1 - 6 ) : 6
Categorization of all features
f
JTlie range of f e a t u r e 1 i s : [f>4, 100)
lEnter ft of s t a t e s of f e a t u r e 1 : 3
Ilpper bound f o r s t a t e 1 of f e a t u r e 1: 73
Jlpper hound f o r s t a t e 2 of f e a t u r e 1 : 91

|

i
feature 1 states:

1

statel

[64, 7 3)

s t a t e 2 [ 7 3 . 91)

s t a t e 3 [ 9 1 , 100)

I

fine range of feature 2 is: [H, 1)
(Enter 8 of stater, of feature 2: 2
Upper bound for state 1 of feature 2: 0.4
feature 2 states:

statel [0, 0. 4)

s t a t e 2 [ 0 , 4 , 1)

The range of feature 3 is: [0, 95.31)
Enter 8 of states of feature 3: 3
ilpper bound for state 1 of feature 3: 23.83
Upper bound for state 2 of feature 3: 71.48
feature 3 states:

statel 10, 23.83)

state2 [23.83, 71.48) state3 [71.48, 95.31)

The range of feature 4 is: 155068, 69871)
Enter 8 of states of feature 4: 3
Upper bound for state 1 of feature 4: 5H768
Ilpper bound for state 2 of feature 4: 66170
feature 4 states:

statel 155068, 58768) state2 [58768, 66170) state3 [66170, 69871)

The range of feature 5 is: [0, 1)
Enter 8 of states of feature 5: 2
Upper bound for state 1 of feature 5: 0.6
feature 5 states:

statel [0, 0.6)

state2 [0.6, 1)

The range of feature 6 is: [0, 43840265?)
lEnter 8 of states of feature 6: 3
|)pper bound for state 1 of feature 6: 1096006
Upper bound for state 2 of feature 6: 328801992
feature 6 states:

;

state! [0, 1096006)

state2 [1096006. 328801992)

Enter tile threshold for False Alarm Kate (0-100): 5
<i,;
•. • :
;
•.,;.; ...
_
^
L
_

Figure 7.9: Categorization.

stati:3 [328801992, 438402657)

Step 4: Waiting for structure learning after categorization.
Bi;C:\WiNDOWS\systern32\cmd.exe
discrete_sample23_s9rial.txt
discrete_sample24.txt
discrete_sample24_serial.txt
discrete_sample25.txt
discrete_sample25_s9rial.txt
discrete_sample2_serial.txt
discret9_sample3.txt
discrGte_sample3_serial.txt
discrete_sampleH.txt
discrete_sample4_serial.txt
discr9te_sample5.txt
discr9t9_sample5_serial.txt
discr9t9_sample6.txt
discr9t9_sampl96_serial.txt
discr9t9_sample7,txt
discr9t9_sampl97_S9rial.txt
discr9t9_sampl98.txt
discr9t9_sampl98_s9rial.txt
discr9t9_sampl99.txt
discrete_sample9_serial.txt
52 fil9(s) copi9d.
Th9 dir9ctory is not empty.
"Catggorization Don9, l9arn structure"
Pr9ss any k9y to continu9 . . .
j j

.

'

_

'

• .•

' J •:

Figure 7.10: Waiting for structure learning.
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Step 5: A well-cited structure learning toolkit, GeNIe & SMILE [65] is
applied for learning the DAG topology (and thus belief network). The structure
learned is shown in Figure 7.11.
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Figure 7.11: Structure learned.

••••f1

:

'K

77

Step 6: After structure learning, waiting for computing and displaying causal
reasoning, diagnostic reasoning, and belief.
£rf C:\WlNDOWS\system32\cmd. exe

discrete_sample2_serial.txt
discrete_sample3.txt
discrete_sample3_serial.txt
discrete_sampleM.txt
discrete_sample4_serial.txt
discrete_sample5.txt
discrete_sample5_serial.txt
discrete_sampleS.txt
discrete_sample6_serial.txt
discrete_sample7.txt
discrete_sample7_serial.txt
discrete_sample8.txt
discrete_sample8_sGrial.txt
discret9_saniple9. txt
discrete_sample9_serial.txt
52 file(s) copied.
The directory is not empty.
"Categorization Done, learn structure"
Press any key to continue . . .
combined.txt
1 file(s) copied.
"Structure learning done, compute S display causal reasoning"
Press any key to continue . . .

Figure 7.12: Waiting for computing and displaying causal reasoning.
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Step 7: The causal reasoning is shown in Figure 7.13. Note that the sum of
each sample is 1.0. Each number stands for the frequency of the state of that sample.

.»' Evaluate?!- Notepad
File

Edit

Format

Vie'A>

Help

Feature: 6
sample!
sample2
samples
sample4
samples
samples
sample?
samples
sample3
samplelO
samplell
sample!2
samplelS
sample14
samplelS
sample16
sample17
samplelS
samplelS
sampleZO
sample21
sample22
sample23
sample24
sample2 5
sample26

A

statel
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0.9000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.1000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

Figure 7.13: Display causal reasoning.

stateZ
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1,0000
0.1000
1.0000
1.0000.
1.0000
0.9000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
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1.0000
0.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000
1.0000

state3 ;
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0.0000 i
0.0000
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0.0000
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Step 8: The diagnostic reasoning is shown in Figure 7.14. Each number stands
for the frequency of the state of that sample compared to the frequency of the state of
all the training samples.

•3' EvaluateLambda- Notepad
File

Edit

Format

View

• ' I.T iiPil

Help

Feature: 6
samplel
sample2
samples
sample4
samp!e5
samples
sample7
sampleS
sample9
samplelO
samplell
samplelZ
sample13
samplel4
samplelS
samplel6
samplel7
samplelS
samplel9
sample20
sample21
sample22
sample23
sample24
sample25
sample26

statel
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0,0000
23.3766
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
2.5974
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
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0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
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Figure 7.14: Display diagnostic reasoning.

state2
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1, 1305
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Step 9: The belief is shown in Figure 7.15. Note that the sum of each sample
is 1.0 after normalizing.

..• EvaluateBeifef - Notepad
File
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Feature: 6
samplel
sample2
samples
sample4
samples
samples
sample?
samples
samples
samplelO
samplell
samplelZ
samplelS
samplel4
samplelS
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sampleIS
sampTel9
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sample21
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sample24
sample25
sample26

statel
0,0000
0.0000
0,0000
0,. 0000
0,9995
0,0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,2210
0.0000
0.0000
0, 0000
0,0000
0.0000
0.. 0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0,0000

state2
1.0000
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1,0000'
1.0000
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1.0000
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1.0000
1.0000
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1,0000
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1.0000
1.0000
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1.0000
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Figure 7.15: Display belief.
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Step 10: The normal range of the target feature is shown in Figure 7.16.

,i Tra!ntng_range - Notepad
File

Edit

Format

View

•

' L !'n]J2l

Help

Feature: 6

A

Range o f s t a t e 1 : [O.OOOO, 0 , 2 2 1 0 ]
Range o f s t a t e 2: [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 , 1 .
Range o f s t a t e 3: [ 0 . 0 0 0 0 , 1.0000]

Figure 7.16: Normal range of the target feature.

Step 11: after above 10 steps, the training process is done, the message is pop
up as shown in Figure 7.17, waiting to start the testing process.
oo C:\WINDOWS\systerr32Vcmd.exe
The d i r e c t o r y 1= not empty.
'Categorization Done, learn structure"
Press any key to continue . . .
combined.txt
1 file(s) copied.
'Structure learning done, compute 8 display causal reasoning"
Press any key to continue
1 file(s) copied.
mean_Pi_record.txt
1 file(s) copied.
1 file(s) copied.
"Compute S display Diagnostic reasoning"
Press any key to continue
Compute & display Belief"
Press any key to continue . . .
"Display the normal range of the target feature"
Press any key to continue
"Training completed! Ready to start testing"
Press any key to continue

Figure 7.17: Waiting to start testing process.

- a[ x*

n

82

Step 12: The belief values of the target feature for FAR is shown in Figure
7.18.
= '?£]

EvaluateBeiief - Notepad
discret e_sample24.txt
discret e_sample2lt_serial
discret e_sample25.txt
discret e_sainple2S_serial txt
discret e_sainple2_serial. txt
discret e_sample3.txt
discret'e_8ainple3_serial. txt
discret'example1*, txt
discret'e_sampleH_serial. txt
discret e_sample5.txt
discret e_sample5_serial. txt
discret e_sample6.txt
discret e_sample6_serial. txt
discret e_sample7.txt
[discret e^saniplei'_serial. txt
discret e_sample8,txt
jdiscret e_sample8_serial. txt
idiscret e_sample9.txt
idiscret e_sample9_serial. txt
52 file(s) copied
The dinectory is not emp ty.
For each sample in the training data, compute fi display belief ualue for FAR"
;Press any key to continue . , .

samplel
sample2
sample 3
samp1e4
samples
sample6
sample?
sample8
sample9
samplelO
sample 11
sample12
samplel3
samplel4
samplel5
sample16
samplel?
5ample18
sample 19
sample20
sample21
sample22
sample23
sample24
sample25
sample26

s tatel
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 9995
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 2210
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000
0 0000

5tate2 state3
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
0 0005 0 0000
X 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
0 7790 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 oooo 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
0 0000 1 0000
l 0000 0 0000
i 0000 0 0000
i 0000 0 0000
l 0000 0 0000
0 0000 1 0000
1 0000 0 0000
0 0000
x1 0000
0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000
1 0000 0 0000

Figure 7.18: Compute and display belief values of the target feature for FAR.
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Step 13: The belief values of the target feature for DR is shown in Figure
7.19.
_*
discrete sariiple21-serial. tx
discrete saniple22.txt
discrete .sample22_serial. tx
discrete .sample23.txt
discrete. sample23_serial.tx
discrete. sattiple2T txt
discrete sample24_serial.tx
discrete. sample25.txt
discrete, sample25_serial.tx1
discrete, santple2_serial" txt
p
discrete. .sample3. txt
discrete.
.saraple3_serial txt
discrete,
sampled.txt
discrete,
.saraple^serial
discrete,
^discrete, sample5.txt
jdiscrete. sample5_serial txt
idiscrete. sampleG.txt
Jdiscrete. sample6„serial txt
;discrete. saraple7.txt
discrete, sample7_SBrial txt
discrete, samples.txt
discrete, sample8_serial txt
discrete. sampled.txt
52 sample9_serial txt
The direc file(s) copied.
tory is not empty
For each sample in the testing data, compute & display beli •f- ualue for DR"
jPress any key to continue . . .
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Figure 7.19: Compute and display belief values of the target feature for DR.
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Step 14: The statistical results of testing are shown in Figure 7.20 and 7.21,
for FAR and DR, respectively. Based on the decision rule and the belief range shown
in step 10, sample 5 is detected as an anomaly, it is false alarmed; sample 16 is missdetected (i.e., sample 16 is an anomaly but not detected using BANBAD). From the
last two lines in Figures 7.20 and 7.21, we observe that the false alarm rate and
detection rate, for the target feature 6, are 3.846% and 96.154%, respectively.
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Figure 7.20: False alarm rate of the running example.

anomaly!

i i

85

*- '

''PXumuiatiVe^.ReS-ylts - Notepad
File

Edit

Format

sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample
sample

Vi a w

*J:*m

Helf.

•feature
1:
2:
feature
3:
•feature
4:
f e a t u re
5:
•featu re
6:
f e a t u re
7:
f e a t u re
S:
f e a t u re
9:
f e a t u re
10:
f e a t u re
11:
f e a t u re
12 :
f e a t u re
13 :
f e a t u re
14 :
f e a t u re
15 :
f e a t u re
16 : a n o m a l y M !
17 :
f e a t u re
18 :
f e a t u re
19 :
f e a t u re
20:
f e a t u re
21:
feature
22 :
feature
23 :
f e a t u re
24 :
feature
25 :
featu re
26 :
feature

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

i s
"j s
is
is
i s
"is
~j s
is
i s
is
i s
is
is

normal
normal
normal
normal
normal
normal
normal,
normal
normal
normal
normal
normal
normal

6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6
6

s
s
i
is
i s
~\ s
ns
is
ns
is
"is

normal
normal
normal.
normal
normal;
normal
normal
normal
normal.
normal

i s normal

u

i s normal:
:
:
:
1
i

•!
•;

;
• ;

i

f l : 3 [ 7 3 ; 91- ]
f 2 : 2 [ O. 4; ] '
f 3 : 3 [ 2 3 .8 3 ; 7 1 . 4 8 ; ]
•f 4 : 3 [ 5 S 7 6 S ; 6617Or ]
f 5 : 2 [ O. 6; ]
f 6 : 3 [ 1 0 9 6 0 0 6; 3 2 S S 0 1 9 9 2; -

•

;

1

:
;
•

i
i

DR :
f 6 : 96. 1 5 4 %

_ _m

Figure 7.21: Detection rate of the running example.

From Figure 7.20 and 7.21, the middle entries, such as fl; 3 [ 73; 91; ]
displays the categorization of the first feature, which means the first feature has three
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discrete states, the range of the first state is < 73, the range of the second state is [73,
91), and the range of the third state is > 91.
Step 15: The last screenshot is shown in Figure 7.22 to indicate one run of the
BANBAD toolkit is completed.
discrete_sample2<4_serial. txt
discrete_sample25.txt
discrete_sample25_serial.txt
discrete_sample2_serial.txt
discrete_sample3.txt
discrete_sample3_serial.txt
diserete_samplei.txt
discrete_sample4_serial.txt
discrete_sample5.txt
discrete_sample5_serial.txt
discrete_sample6.txt
discrete_sample6_serial.txt
discrete_sample7.txt
discrete_sample7_serial.txt
discrete_sample8.txt
:discrete_sample8_serial.txt
discrete_sample9.txt
discrete_sample9_serial.txt
52 file(s) copied.
The directory is not empty.

_±l

"For each sample in the testing data, compute 5 display belief ualue for DR"
Press any key to continue . . .

_J

"Display results (FAR S DR) on desktop with Cumulatiue_Results.txt"
Press any key to continue . . .
Cumulatiue_Results txt
1 file(s) copied.
" fill done!!! "...
Press any key to continue . . .

jj

Figure 7.22: Final screen when the BANBAD toolkit completes one run.

Note that running BANBAD toolkit typically takes less than 1 minute for both
training and testing processes to complete with a sample size of 1000 and 100
samples, tested on Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T7300 @ 2.00GHz, 2GB running
Windows XP.

CHAPTER VIII
SUMMARY AND FUTURE WORK

We showed that MPB anomaly detection algorithm is effective for mobile
networks. Each node's normal mobility profile is modeled as a Multi-Leaf tree
structure. Clusters, generated through data mining, and the corresponding pattern
strings, generated through fuzzy logic, are the two fundamental elements of the MultiLeaf tree structure. Our proposed algorithm is then developed to detect potential
internal attackers - masquerades in particular. Simulation results demonstrate that our
proposed algorithm can achieve desirable performance in terms of both the false
alarm rate and the detection rate for nodes with regular movement behaviors through
a fine tuning the design parameter-threshold. Efficient fine tuning of this algorithm
provides success and, subsequently, a basis for better anomaly detection in all mobile
networks.
The novelty of MPB technique lies in easily generating and maintaining the
normal profile; solving the more challenging problem of handling many closer points
and mobility patterns; achieving fairly good performance without strong assumptions
and finally determining the design parameter, threshold, efficiently.
We next developed BANBAD and showed it to be an efficient anomaly
detection technique based on belief networks that can handle incomplete samples and
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multiple features. It has the potential to achieve high detection rates while reducing
false alarm rates. Note that while our examples used energy consumption as the target
feature for anomaly detection, our technique can be used to detect anomaly in any
feature. It is not restricted to using energy consumption as the target feature for
anomaly detection.
Our BANBAD technique is also based on statistical approach and
significantly contributes to the field of anomaly detection in a few ways. First, it
describes a method of easily generating and maintaining a profile; second, it achieves
both high detection rate (>95%) and low false alarm rate (<5%) for the target feature,
and false alarm rate can be bounded by certain predefined threshold; third, BANBAD
is tested under many different statistical distributions, not limited to normal
distributed dataset; fourth, it is widely applicable under different, network scenarios,
not limited to a specific network, e.g., ad hoc network, wireless sensor network,
wireless network, etc.; fifth, BANBAD has the potential to function with an
incomplete sample in the testing process, this function is useful in ad hoc networks,
because its dynamically changing topology can result in the incomplete observations
for the selected features; sixth BANBAD exhibits excellent performance on the two
real datasets we used, in addition to achieving good performance, it detect anomaly
efficiently and accurately; seventh, the BANBAD toolkit developed allows one to use
it for anomaly detection easily and effectively.
There is, obviously, potential for future work. Recall that the centralized
BANBAD addressed in chapter IV, we have a one time training process to generate a

normal profile; however, to keep the normal profile updated and use it for further
testing, it's good to design an adaptive learning technique for BANBAD. Intuitively,
the more the information gain, the better the performance. The challenge lies in: how
to take the error accumulation into account. Here, error could be defined as the
summation of the false alarm rate (FAR) and miss-detection rate (-4-DR), and the
goal is to bound the error while involving more data for training. Based on the
sequential hypothesis testing [74], such error should be theoretically bounded;
otherwise, we reach the stopping point, and need to check the machine and/or data
collection errors.
Furthermore, distributed BANBAD could be developed for both the
BANBAD processes (training and testing), data and features collection, etc.; seasonal
effect, time series technique could be involved for users to select different time
periods for anomaly detection, not just from human intuition and/or personal
experience; feature selection technique could be explored under different network
scenarios for anomaly detection, intuitively, the more the relationship among the
features, the better the performance of BANBAD, especially for testing incomplete
samples; and structure learning technique could be developed under the following
minimum requirements: it integrates many well cited structure learning algorithms; it
can test both discrete and continuous datasets; and it has the functionality of console
debugging. Therefore, BANBAD toolkit can be upgraded to fully automated version
by smoothly incorporating such structure learning techniques, and effectively test any
dataset.

Appendix A
BANBAD Toolkit Source Code

C# source codes of various BANBAD Toolkit modules are listed here.
/ * Categorizationjxairting:

Categorize discrete states of all features

*

* Author:
* Input:
* Output:

Chaoli Cai
DatasetInfo.txt, n samples (raw data)
record .frorn_discretized.txt, statesFromTraining.txt,
subfolder (discrete_sampleO_serial,
discrete_samplel_serial, ...)

*

* Modified:
*

11/20/09

*/

using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System.Text.RegularExpressions;
using System.10;
namespace Categorization
{
class Categorization
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
// read info, from DatasetInfo.txt
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader("DatasetInfo.txt");
int NumberOfSamples = ConvertToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
int NumberOfFeatures = Convert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
int MaxNumberOfStates = Convert.ToInt32(sr,ReadLineQ);
// output summary to console
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Console.WriteLine("Summary of Dataset:");
Console.Writel_ine("# of samples: {0}", NumberOfSamples);
CortsoIe.WriteLine("# of features: {0}", NumberOfFeatures);
Console. WriteLinefMax # of states: {0}", MaxNumberOfStates);
// enter the target feature for anomaly detection
StreamWriter tarFeature = new StrearnWr1ter("targetFeature.txt");
string readTargetFeature;
int targetFeature;
while (true)
{
Console.Write("\nEnter the target feature for anomaly detection
( { 0 } - { l } ) : ", 1, NumberOfFeatures);
readTargetFeature = Consoie.ReadLine();
if (IsUint(readTargetFeature) &&
(Convert.ToInt32(readTargetFeature) <= NumberOfFeatures
&&Convert.ToInt32(readTargetFeature) >= 1))
{
targetFeature = Corwert.ToInt32(readTargetFeature);
break;
}
}
tarFeature.WriteLine(targetFeature);
tarFeature.Close();
Console.WriteLine("\nCategorization of all features");
// get the range for each feature
doublet,] Range = new double[NumberOfFeatures, 2];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
Range[i, 0] = Convert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLine());
Rangefi, 1] = Convert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLineQ);
}
int[] NumberOfStates = new int[NumberOfFeaturesJ;
doublet,,] States = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates, 2];
// initialize state j of feature i
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
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for (int j = 0; j < MaxNumberOfStates; j + + )
{
States[i, j , 0] = 0;
Statesjj, j , 1] = 0;
}
}
Consoie.WriteUne();
double[] IntermediateState = new double[NumberOfFeatures];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
IntermediateState[i] = 0;
// setup states for each feature
categorization(NumberOfFeatures, Range, NumberOfStates, States,
IntermediateState, MaxNumberOfStates);
// setup threshold
double threshold;
while (true)
{
Console.Write("\nEnter the threshold for False Alarm Rate (0-

100): ");
string thresh = Console.Readl_ine();
if (IsNumber(thresh))
{
threshold = Convert.ToDouble(thresh);
break;
}
}
// files operation
string crrrentDir = Directory.GetCurrentDirectory();
string NumOfStates_folder = "subfolder";
Directory.CreateDirectory(NumOfStates_folder);
StreamWriter rec = new
Stream Wnter('Yecord jTom_discretized.txt");
rec.WriteLine(NumberOfSamples);
rec.WriteLine(NumberOfFeatures);
rec.WriteLine(threshold);
for (int f = 0; f < NumberOfFeatures; f++)
{
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rec.WriteLine(NumberOfStates[f]);
}
rec.WriteLine(MaxNumberOfStates);
rec.WriteLine(targetFeature);
rec.CloseQ;
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
StreamReader sr_serial = new StreamReader("sample" +
d.ToString() + "_serial.txt");
int NumberOfRows = Convert ToInt32(sr_serial,ReadLine());
double[] value = new double[NumberOfRows *
NumberOf Features];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfRows; i++)
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfFeatures; j + + )
value[i * NumberOfFeatures + j] =
Convert. ToDouble(sr_serial.ReadLine());
Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(NumOfStates_folder);
StreamWriter sw_serial = new StreamWriter("discrete_sample"
+ d.ToString() + "_serial.txt");
Si.reamWriter sw = new StreamWriterC'discrete sample" +
d.ToString() + ".txt");
sw_serial.WriteLine("{0}", NumberOfRows);
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
sw.Write("f" + (i + l).ToString() + "\t");
}
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfRows; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfFeatures; j + + )
{
bool founded = false;
for (int k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[j] - 1; k++)
{
if ((value[i * NumberOfFeatures + j] > =
StatesQj, k, 0]) && (value[i *
NumberOfFeatures + j] < StatesfJ, k, 1]))

{
sw_serial.WriteLine("{0} ", k + 1);
if (j == NumberOfFeatures - 1)
sw.Write("{0,-6}", k + 1);
else
sw.Write("{0,-6}\t", k + 1);
founded = true;
break;
}
}
if (founded == false)
{
if ((valuep * NumberOfFeatures + j] <
States[j, 0, 0]))
{
sw_serial.WriteUne("{0} ", l ) ;
if (j == NumberOfFeatures - 1)
sw.Whte( !, {0 r 6}", 1);
else
sw.WriteC'IOrSJW', 1);
}
else
{
sw_serial.WriteLine("{0} ",
NumberOfStates[j]);
if (j == NumberOfFeatures - 1)
sw.Write(' ! {0 r 6}*',
NumberOfStates[j]);
else
sw.Write("{0,-6}\t",
NumberOfStates[j]);
}
}
}
sw.WriteLine();
}
sw_serial.Close();
sw.Close();
Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(crrrentDir);
}
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// type checking for numbers
public static bool IsNumber(string input)
{
string pattern = " A -?\\d+$| A (-?\\d+)(\\.\\d+)?$";
Regex regex = new Regex(pattem);
return regex.IsMatch(input);
}
// type checking for positive interger numbers
public static bool IsUint(string input)
{
Regex regex = new Regex(" A [0-9]*[l-9][0-9]*$");
return regex.IsMatch(input);
}
// categorization for each feature
public static void categorization(int NumberOfFeatures, doublet,]
Range, int[] NumberOfStates, double[,,] States, double[]
IntermediateState, int MaxNumberOfStaf.es)
{
StreamWriter statesFromTraining = new
SireamWrsterCstatesFromTraining.txt");
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
IntermediateStatep] = 0;
if(i==0)
Console. WriteLine("The range of feature {0} is:
[{1}, {2})", (i + l).ToString(), Range[i, 0],
Range[i, 1]);
else
Console.WriteLine("\nThe range of feature {0} is:
[{1}, {2})", (i + l).ToString()," Range[i, 0],
Range[i, 1]);
//type checking for # of states of features (Integer type)
while (true)
{
Console.Write("Enter # of states of feature " + (i
+ l).ToString() + ": ");
string inputOfStates = Console.ReadLine();
if (IsUint(inputOfStates) &&
(Convert.ToInt32(inputOfStates) < =
MaxNumberOfStates))
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{
NumberOfStates[i] =
Convert.ToInt32(inputOfStates);
break;
}
>

statesFromTraining.WriteLine(NumberOfStates[i]);
IntermediateState[i] = Range[i, 0];
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfStates[i] - 1; j + + )
{
States[i, j , 0] = IntermediateState[i];
//type checking for states (Double type)
while (true)
{
Consc!e.Write("Upper bound for state " + (j
+ l).ToString() + '* of feature " + (i +
l).ToString() + "i ");
string state = Console.ReadLine();
if (IsNumber(state))
{
States[i, j , 1] =
Convert.ToDouble(state);
statesFromTraining.WriteLine(States[
U , i]);
break;
}
>

while (true)
{
if (((j != 0) m (Statesp, j , 1] > States[i, j ,
0])&&(States[i,j, l ] < R a n g e [ i , I ] ) ) | | ( ( j
= = 0) && (States[i, j , 1] >= States[i, j , 0])
&& (States[i, j , 1] < Range[i, 1])))
break;
else
{
//type checking for states (Double type)
while (true)
{
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Console.Write("Upper bound for
state " + (j + l).ToString() + " of
feature " + (i + l).ToString() + ": ");
string temp = Console.ReadLine();
if (IsNumber(temp))
{
States[i, j , 1] =
Convert.ToDouble(temp);
statesFromTraining.WriteLine(
States[i, j , 1]);
break;
}
}
}
}
IntermediateState[i] = States[i, j , 1];
}
// output discrete states settings to console
Console.WriteLine();
Console.Write("feature {0} states: \t", (i + l).ToString());
for (int j = 0; j <= NumberOfStatesp] - 1; j + + )
{
if (NumberOfStates[i] = = 1 )
{
Consoie.Write("state{0} [ { ! } , {2}) ", (j +
l).ToString(), Range[i, 0], Range[i, 1]);
}
else if (j == NumberOfStates[i] - 1)
{
Consote.Write("state{0} [{1}, {2}) ", (j +
l).ToString(), IntermediateState[i], Range[i, 1]);
}
else
{
Consoie.Write("state{0} [{1}, {2}) ", Q +
l).ToString(), States[i, j , 0], States[i, j , 1]);
}
}
Console.WriteLine();
}
statesFromTraining.CloseQ;

}}}

/ * SampleCombiner; Combine training samples after categorization for
structure learning
* Author:
* Input:
* Output:

Chaoli Cai
recordJrom_discretized.txt, subfolder
(discrete_sampleO_serial.txt, discrete_samplel_serial
combined.txt

* Modified:

11/20/09

*

*/

using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System. 10;
namespace SampleCombiner
{
class SampleCombiner
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
StrearnReader sr = new
StreamReader("record_from_discretized.txt");
int NumberOfSamples = Convert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
int NumberOfFeatures = Conyert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
// output table header
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter("combined.txt");
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures - 1; i++)
{
sw.Write("f" + (i + l).ToString() + "\t");
}
sw.Write("f" + (NumberOfFeatures).ToStringO);
sw.WriteLine();
// combine samples after categorization
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfSamples; i++)
{

StreamReader sr__discrete__sample = new
StreamReader("discrete_sample" + i.ToString() + "_serial.txt");
int cases = Convert.ToInt32(sr_discrete_sample.ReadLine());
for (int j = 0; j < cases; j++)
{
for (int k = 0; k < NumberOfFeatures; k++)
{
if (k ! — NumberOfFeatures - 1)

sw.Write("{0,-6}\t",
Convert.ToInt32(sr_discrete_sample.ReadLi
ne()));
else
sw.Write("{0,-6}",
Convert.ToInt32(sr_discrete_sample.ReadLi
ne()));
}
sw.WriteLineQ;
}
}
sw.Close();

/ * BeliefComputationJraining: Compute belief ranges for all features
during the training process
* Author:
* Input:
* Output:

Chaoli Cai
record_from_discretized.txt, subfoider
(discrete_sampleO_serial, discrete_samplel_serial, ...)
belief ranges for all features

* Modified:

11/20/09

using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
System.Text;
System.10;

namespace BeliefComputation
{
class BeliefComputation
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
// read info. (NumberOfSamples, NumberOfFeatures, threshold)
from record_from_discretized.txt
Stream Reader sr_record = new
StTeamReaderfrecord_from_discretized.txt");
int NumberOfSamples =
Convert.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
int NumberOfFeatures =
Convert;.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
double threshold = Convert.ToDouble(sr_record.ReadLine());
// read info, from targetFeature.txt
StreamReader tF = new StreamReaderCtargetFeature.txt");
int targetFeature = Convert ToInt32(tF.ReadLine());
StreamVVriter PiRecord = new StreamWHter("pi_record.txt");
StrearnWriter EvaluatePiRecord = new
StreamWriter("EvaluatePi.txt");
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EvaluatePiRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
StreamVVrifer EvaluateLambdaRecord = new
StreaniVVriter("Evaiuate Lambda.txt");
EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
StreamWriter EvaluateSigmaRecord = new
St:reamWriter("EvaluateSigma.txt");
EvaluateSigmaRecord.WriteLine(!lFeature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
StrearnWriter EvaluateBeliefRecord = new
StreamVVrit:er("EvaluateBelief.txt");
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Writel_ine("Feature; " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
StreamWriter Training^range = new
StreamWnier("Training_range.txt");
Stream Writer Training_range_serial = new
StreamWriterCTraining_range_serial.txt");
int[] NumberOfStates = new int[NumberOfFeatures];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
NumberOfStates[i] =
Conv6rt.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
}
int MaxNumberOfStates =
Convert.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
int NumberOfDatasets = 0;
StreamReader[] sr_file = new
StreamReader[NumberOfSamples];
int[] NumberOfRows = new int[NumberOfSamples];
int TotalCases = 0;
doublet,] TempPi = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,] Total = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,] Mean = new doubletNumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];

doublet,,] Lambda = new double[NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,,] Belief = new double[NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,,] Pi = new double[NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
double[,] Sigma = new double[NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures];
doublet] SortBelief = new double[NumberOfSamples];
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
for (int c = 0; c < MaxNumberOfStates; C++)
{
TempPifr, c] = 0;
Total[r, c] = 0;
Meanfr, c] = 0;
>

}
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
Sigmatd, r] = 0;
for (int c = 0; c < MaxNumberOfStates; C++)
{
Pi[d, r, c] = 0;
Lambdafd, r, c] = 0;
Belieftd, r, c] = 0;
}
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
if ((i + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStatesp]; C++)
{
if ( c = = 0)
{

EvaluatePiRecord.Write("\t\tstate{0}'*
, (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateLambdaRecord,Write("\t\tsta
te{0}", (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write("\t\tstate{
0}", (c + l).ToString());
}
else
{
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("\t\tstate{0}"
, (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write("\tstate
{0}", (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write("\tstate{0
}", (c + l).ToString());
}
}
EvaluatePiRecord.WriteLine();
EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLine();
EvaluateBeliefRecord.WriteLine();
}
for (int Sample = 0; Sample < NumberOfSamples; Sample++)
{
if (File.Exists("discrete_sample" + Sample.ToStringO +
"_serial.txt"))
{
NumberOfDatasets++;
sr_file[Sample] = new
St/eamR.e3Cjer("discrete_sample'r +
Sample.ToStringO + "_serial.txt");
NumberOfRows[Sample] =
Convert. ToInt32(sr_file[Sample].ReadLine());
TotalCases = TotalCases +
l\lumberOfRows[Sample];
int[,] CellValues = new
int[NumberOfRows[Sample], NumberOfFeatures];
for (int row = 0; row < NumberOfRows[Sample];

row++)
{

for (int col = 0; col < NumberOfFeatures;
col++)
{
CellValues[row, col] =
Convert ToInt32(sr_file[Sample].Rea
dUne());
}
}
// compute causal reasoning
causalReasoningComputation(NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates, NumberOfRows, NumberOfStates,
CellValues, Sample, Pi, PiRecord, EvaluatePiRecord, TempPi,
Total, targetFeature);
}
else
continue;
}
PiRecord.Close();
string answer = "training";
if (answer == "training")
{
Stream Writer mean_Pi_record = new
StreamW'riter("mean_Pi_record.txt");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
Mean[r, c] = Total[r, c] /
NumberOfSamples;
mean_PLrecord.WriteLine("{0:f4}\t",
Mean[r, c]);
}
}
}
mean_Pi_record.Close();
}
EvaluatePiRecord. CloseQ;

// get mean of causal Reasoning
StreamReader sr = new St:reamReader("mean_PLrecord.txt");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
Mean[r, c] - Convert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLine());
}
}
// compute disgnostic reasoning
disgnosticReasoningComputation(NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, NumberOfStates, Mean, Pi,
EvaluateLambdaRecord, Lambda, targetFeature);
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Close();
// compute sigma
sigmaComputation(NumberOfSamples, NumberOfFeatures,
NumberOfStates, Pi, Lambda, EvaluateSigmaRecord, Sigma,
targetFeature);
EvaluateSigmaRecord.Close();
// compute beiief
beliefComputation(NumberOfSamples, NumberOfFeatures,
NumberOfStates, Pi, Lambda, Sigma, Belief,
EvaluateBeliefRecord, targetFeature);
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Close();
// get belief ranges for all features
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
Training_range.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
Training_range.WriteLine();
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
Training_range.Write("Range of state {0}: ", (c +
l).ToString());

for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
SortBelief[d] = Belief[d, r, c];
}
SortandGetRanges(SortBelief);
Training_range.Write(!,[{0:f4}, { l : f 4 } ] " ,
SortBelief[(int)((double)(threshold)/
(double)NumberOfStates[r])],
SortBelief[(int)(NumberOfSamples (double)(threshold) /
(double)NumberOfStates[r])]);
Training_range.WriteLine();
Training_range_serial.WriteLine("{0:f4}",
SortBelief[(int)((double)(threshold)/
(double)NumberOfStates[r])]);
Training_range_serial.WriteLine("{0:f4}",
SortBelief[(int)(NumberOfSamples (double)(threshold) /
(double)NumberOfStates[r])J);
}
Training_range.WriteLine();
}
}
Training_range.Close();
Training_range_serial.Close();
}
// sort belief values
static void SortandGetRanges(double[] SortBelief)
{
for (int i = 0; i < SortBelief.Length; i++)
{
int s = i;
for (int j = i + 1; j < SortBelief.Length; j + + )
{
if (SortBeliefrj] < SortBelief[s])
{
s =j ;
}
}
double t = SortBelief[i];
SortBelief[i] - SortBelief[s];

SortBelief[s] = t;
}
}
// compute causa! reasoning (pi)
static void causalReasoningComputation(int NumberOfFeatures, int
MaxNumberOfStates, int[] NumberOfRows, int[] NumberOfStates,
int[,] CellValues, int Sample, doublet,,] Pi, StreamWriter PiRecord,
StreamWriter EvaluatePiRecord, double[,] TempPi, doublet,] Total, int
targetFeature)
{
Consote.WriteLine("\nsampie " + Sample.ToStringO);
int[,] freq = new int[NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
Console.WriteLine();
for (int f = 0; f < NumberOfFeatures; f++)
{
if ((f + 1) == targetFeature)
{
if (Sample < 9)
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("\nsampie" + (Sample
+ l).ToString() + "\t\t");
else
EvaluatePiRecord. Write("\nsample" + (Sample
+ l).ToString() + "\t");
int k = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < l\lumberOfRows[Sample]; j + + )
{
for (k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[f]; k++)
{
if (CellValues[j, f] == k + 1)
{
freq[f, k]++;
break;
}
}
}
Console.WriteLine("\tfeature " + (f +
l).ToString());
for (k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[f]; k++)
{
TempPi[f, k] = (double)freq[f, k] /
NumberOf Rows[Sample];

Total[f, k] = Total[f, k] + TempPi[f, k];
CoRso!e.WriteLine("\t\tstate " + (k +
l).ToString() + " pi: {0:f4} ", TempPi[f, k]);
PiRecord.WriteLine("{0:f4}", TempPi[f, k]);
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("{0:f4}\t",
TempPi[f, k]);
Pi[Sample, f, k] = TempPi[f, k];
}
EvaluatePiRecord.WriteLine();
}
}
}
// compute diagnostic reasoning (lambda)
static void disgnosticReasoningComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet,] Mean, doublet,,]
Pi, StreamWriter EvaluateLambdaRecord, doublet,,] Lambda, int
targetFeature)
{
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)

{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
if (d < 9)
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write("\nsam
pie" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t\t");

else
EvaluateLambdaRecord, Write("\nsam
pie" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t");
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r];
C+ + )

{
if (Mean[r, c] == 0)
{
Lambda[d, r, c] = 1;
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write(
"{0:f4}\t", Lambdatd, r, c]);

}
else
{

Lambda[d, r, c] = Pi[d, r, c] /
Mean[r, c];
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write(
"{0:f4}\t", Lambda[d, r, c]);
}
}
EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLineO;

}
// compute sigma
static void sigmaComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet, J Pi, doublet,,]
Lambda, StreamWriter EvaluateSigmaRecord, doublet,] Sigma, int
targetFeature)
{
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
Sigmatd, r] = Sigmatd, r] + Pi[d, r, c] *
Lambdafd, r, c];
}
EvaluateSigmaRecord.WriteLine("{0:f4}", Sigmatd,
r]);
}
}
}
}
// compute belief (by applying the Bayes's rule)
static void beliefComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet,,] Pi, doublet,,]
Lambda, doublet,] Sigma, doublet,,] Belief, StreamWriter
EvaluateBeliefRecord, int targetFeature)
{

for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
if (d < 9)
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write("\nsample" + (d +
l).ToString() + "\t\t");
else
EvaluateBeliefRecord,Write("\nsamp!e" + (d +
l).ToString() + "\t");
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
if (Sigma[d, r] == 0)
Belief[d, r, c] = 1;
else
Belief[d, r, c] = Pi[d, r, c] * Lambda[d, r, c]
/ Sigma[d, r];
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write("{0:f4}\t!', Belief[d, r,
c]);
}
EvaluateBeliefRecord.WriteLine();
}

Ill
/ * Categorization Jesting;
* Author:
* Input:
* Output:

Categorize discrete states of ail features

Chaoii Cai
DatasetInfo.txt, statesFromTraining.txt, n samples (raw
data)
record_from_discretized.txt, subfolder
(discrete_sampleO_serial, discrete_samplel_serial, ...)

*

* Modified:
*

11/20/09

*/

using
using
using
using
using

System;
System.Collections.Generic;
System.Linq;
System.Text;
System.10;

namespace Categorization
{
class Categorization
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
// read info, from DatasetInfo.txt
StreamReader sr = new StreamReader("DatasetInfo.txt");
int NumberOfSamples = Convert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
int NumberOfFeatures = €onvert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
int MaxNumberOfStates = Convert.ToInt32(sr.ReadLine());
// get the range for each feature
doublet,] Range = new double[NumberOfFeatures, 2];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
Range[i, 0] = Corwert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLine());
Range[i, 1] = Ccnvert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLine());
}
int[] NumberOfStates = new int[NumberOfFeatures];
double[,,] States = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates, 2];
// initialize state j of feature i
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for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < MaxNumberOfStates; j + + )
{
Statesp, j , 0] = 0;
States[i, j , 1] = 0;
}
}
Console.WriteLine();
double[] IntermediateState = new double[NumberOfFeatures];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
IntermediateState[i] = 0;
// setup states for each feature
categorization(NumberOfFeatures, Range, NumberOfStates,
States, IntermediateState);
// files operation
string currentDir = Directory.GetCurrentDirectory();
string NumOfStates_folder = "subfolder";
Directory.CreateDirectory(NumOfStates_folder);
StreatnWnter rec = new
StreamWriter("record_from_discretized.txt");
rec.WriteLine(NumberOfSamples);
rec.WriteLine(NumberOfFeatures);
for (int f = 0; f < NumberOfFeatures; f++)
{
rec.WriteLine(NumberOfStates[f]);
}
rec.WriteLine(MaxNumberOfStates);
rec.Close();
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
StreamReader sr_serial = new StreamReaderC'sample" +
d.ToString() + "_serial.txt");
int NumberOfRows =
Convert.ToInt32(sr_serial.ReadLine());
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doublet] v a l u e - new double[NumberOfRows *
NumberOfFeatures];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfRows; i++)
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfFeatures; j + + )
value[i * NumberOfFeatures + j] =
Convert ToDouble(sr_serial,ReadLineQ);
Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(NumOfStates_folder);
StreamWriter sw_serial = new
StreamWriter("discrete_sample" + d.ToString() +
"__serial.txt");
StreamWriter sw = new StreamWriter("discrete_sample"
+ d.ToString() + ".txt");
sw_serial.WriteLine(r'{0}", NumberOfRows);
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures - 1; i++)
{
sw.Write("f" + (i + l).ToString() + "\t");
}
sw.Write("f" + (NumberOfFeatures).ToStringO);
sw.WriteLine();
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfRows; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfFeatures; j + + )
{
bool founded = false;
for (int k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[j] - 1;
k++)
{
if ((value[i * NumberOfFeatures +
j] >= States[j, k, 0]) && (value[i *
NumberOfFeatures + j] < Statesfj, k,
1]))
{
sw_serial.WriteLine("{0} ", k

+ i);
lf(j==
NumberOfFeatures - 1)
sw.Write("{0,6}", k + 1);
else
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sw.Write("{0,~
6}\t", k + 1);
founded = true;
break;
}
}
if (founded == false)
{
if ((value[i * NumberOfFeatures + j]
< Statesfj, 0, 0]))
{
sw_serial.WriteUne(!'{0} ",

i);
if (j == NumberOfFeatures 1)
sw.Write(!,{0,-6}", 1);
else
sw.Write("{0,-6}\t", 1);
}
else
{
sw_serial.WriteLine("{0} ",
NumberOfStatesfj]);
if (j == NumberOfFeatures 1)
sw.Write("{0,-6>",
NumberOfStatesFj]);
else
sw.Write("{0,-6}\t",
NumberOfStates[j]);
>

}
>

sw.WriteLine();
}
sw_serial.Close();
sw.Close();
Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(currentDir);
}
}
// categorization for each feature

public static void categorization(int NumberOfFeatures, doublet,]
Range, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet, /] States, doublet]
IntermediateState)
{
'- ••• statesFromTraining = new
-'•> • •("statesFromTraining.txt");
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
NumberOfStates[i] =
: :.ToInt32(statesFromTraining.ReadLine());
IntermediateStateti] = Rangefi, 0];
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfStatesti] - 1; j + + )
{
Statesti, j , 0] = IntermediateStateti];
Statesfi, j , 1] =
.ToDouble(statesFromTraining.ReadUne())
while (true)
{
if ((Statesfi, j , 1] >= Statesti, j , 0]) &&
(Statesfi, j , 1] < Rangefi, 1]))
break;
else
Statesti, j , 1] =
.--..: .ToDouble(statesFromTrainin
g.ReadLine());
}
IntermediateStateti] = States[i, j , 1];
}
}
statesFromTraining. CloseQ;
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/ * BeliefComputationJesting:

Compute belief for the target feature

*

* Author:
* Input:
* Output:

* Modified:

Chaoli Cai
record_from.discretized.txt, subfolder
(discrete__sampieO serial, discrete_..samplel_serial, ...)
detail info (anomaly/normal for each sample),
categorization, and statistical results
11/20/09

using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using System.Linq;
using System.Text;
using System.10;
namespace BeliefComputation
{
class BeiiefC ,n.' •••,,:
{
static void Main(string[] args)
{
// read info. (NumberOfSamples & NumberOfFeatures) from
record.„from._dis:retized.txt
sr_record = new
("record_from_discretized.txt");
int NumberOfSamples =
.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
int NumberOfFeatures =
C onv•;': .ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
// read info, from iarqetFeature.txt
.-• •.
••
tF = new
>
.
("targetFeature.txt");
int targetFeature =
ToInt32(tF.ReadLine());
PiRecord = new :
EvaluatePiRecord = new
("EvaluatePi.txt");
EvaluatePiRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToString());

("pLrecord.txt");
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Si-' '
EvaluateLambdaRecord = new
S J,
("EvaluateLambda.txt");
EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
.- •.
EvaluateSigmaRecord = new
'•>
("EvaluateSigma.txt");
EvaluateSigmaRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
EvaluateBeliefRecord = new
^ .
.
("EvaluateBelief.txt");
EvaluateBeliefRecord.WriteLine("Feature: " +
targetFeature.ToStringO);
int[] NumberOfStates = new int[NumberOfFeatures];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
NumberOfStates[i] =
.ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
>

int MaxNumberOfStates =
C HI, .ToInt32(sr_record.ReadLine());
int NumberOfDatasets = 0;
[] sr_fi Ie = new
[NumberOfSamples];
int[] NumberOfRows = new int[NumberOfSamples];
int TotalCases = 0;
doublet,] TempPi = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,] Total = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,] Mean = new doubletNumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,,] Lambda = new doubletNumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,,] Belief = new doubletNumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,,] Pi = new doubletNumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
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doublet,] Sigma = new double[NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures];
doublet] SortBelief = new double[NumberOfSamples];
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
for (int c = 0; c < MaxNumberOfStates; C++)
{
TempPi[r, c] = 0;
Total[r, c] = 0;
Mean[r, c] = 0;
}
}
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
Sigma[d, r] = 0;
for (int c - 0; c < MaxNumberOfStates; C++)
{
Pi[d, r, c] - 0;
Lambda[d, r, c] = 0;
Belief[d, r, c] = 0;
}
}
}
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfFeatures; i++)
{
if ((i + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[i]; C++)
{
i f ( c = = 0)
{
EvaluatePiRecord,Write("\t\tstate{0}"
, (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write("\t\tsta
te{0}", (c + l).ToString());
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write("\t\tstate{
0}", (c + l).ToString());

119
}
else
{
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("\tstate{0},,/
(c + l).ToString());
Eva I uateLambda Record. Write("\tstat
e{0}", (c + l).ToString());
EvaIuateBeliefRecord.Write("\tstate{
0}", (c + l).ToString());
}
}
EvaluatePiRecord.WriteLine();
EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLine();
EvaluateBeliefRecord.WriteLine();
}
}
// get testing samples from subfolder
for (int Sample = 0; Sample < NumberOfSamples; Sample++)
{
if (Fi!e.Exists("discrete_sample" + Sample.ToString() +
"_serial.txt"))
{
NumberOfDatasets++;
sr_file[Sample] = new StreamReader("discrete_sample".
+ Sample.ToString() + "_serial.txt");
NumberOfRows[Sample] =
Convert.ToInt32(sr_file[Sample].ReadLine());
TotalCases = TotalCases + NumberOfRows[Sample];
int[,] CellValues = new int[NumberOfRows[Sample],
NumberOfFeatures];
for (int row = 0; row < NumberOfRows[Sample];
row++)
{
for (int col = 0; col < NumberOfFeatures; col++)
{
CellValues[row, col] =
Convert.ToInt32(sr_file[Sample].ReadLine()
);

}
}

// compute causal reasoning
causalReasoningComputation(NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates, NumberOfRows, NumberOfStates,
CellValues, Sample, Pi, PiRecord, EvaluatePiRecord, TempPi,
Total, targetFeature);
}
else
continue;
}
PiRecord.Close();
EvaluatePiRecord.Close();
StreamReader sr = new Str'earnReader("mean_PLrecord.txt");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < l\lumberOfStates[r]; C++)
Mean[r, c] = Convert.ToDouble(sr.ReadLine());
}
}
// compute diagnostic reasoning
disgnosticReasoningComputation(NumberOfSamples,
NumberOfFeatures, NumberOfStates, Mean, Pi,
EvaluateLambdaRecord, Lambda, targetFeature);
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Close();
// compute sigrna
sigmaComputation(NumberOfSamples, NumberOfFeatures,
NumberOfStates, Pi, Lambda, Sigma, EvaluateSigmaRecord,
targetFeature);
EvaluateSigmaRecord. CloseQ;
// compute belief
beliefComputation(NumberOfSamples, NumberOfFeatures,
NumberOfStates, Pi, Lambda, Sigma, Belief, EvaluateBeliefRecord,
targetFeature);
EvaluateBeliefRecord. CloseQ;
StreamReader sc = new StreamReader("structure_comparison.txt");

int[] same = new int[NumberOfSamples];
for (int i = 0; i < NumberOfSamples; i++)
same[i] = Convert.ToInt32(sc.ReadLine());
doublet,] min = new double[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
doublet,] max = new doub!e[NumberOfFeatures,
MaxNumberOfStates];
StrearnReader range = new
StreamReaderCTraining_range_serial.txt");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
min[r, c] = Corivert.ToDouble(range.ReadLine());
max[r, c] = Convert.ToDouble(range.ReadLine());
}
}
}
StrearnReader FN = new StreamReader("Filename.txt");
string ans = FN.ReadLine();
// apply decision rule for anomaly detection and write results to
"Cumulative_Results.txt"
StreamWriter SW;
SW = ri!e.AppendText("Cumu!ative„Resu!ts.txt!!);
SW.WriteLine("
SW.WriteLine("
int[] res = new int[NumberOfFeatures];
int DiffStruc = 0;
for (int f = 0; f < NumberOfFeatures; f++)
res[f] = 0;
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
bool foundAnomaly = false;
if (same[d] != 1)

");
—");

{
DiffStruc+ + ;
if (ans == "FAR")
{
Console.WriteLine("sample {0} is an anomaly!!!",
(d + l).ToString());
SW.Writel_ine("sample {0} is an anomaly!!!", (d +
l).ToString());
}
else if (ans == "DR")
{
Ccnsoie.WriteLine("sample {0} is normal!", (d +
l).ToString());
SW.WriteLine("sample {0} is normal!", (d +
l).ToString());
}
continue;

}
else
{
Console.Writefsample {0}:", (d + l).ToString());
SW.Write("sample {0}:", (d + l).ToString());
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r]; C++)
{
if (ans == "DR")
{
if ((Math.Round(Belief[d, r, c], 4) > =
max[r, c]) || (Math.Round(Belief[d,
r, c], 4) <= min[r, c]))
{
Console.WriteLine("{0} {1}
{2}", Belief[d, r, c], max[r, c],
min[r, c]);
foundAnomaly = true;
break;
}
}
else if (ans == "FAR")

}

if ((Math.Round(Belief[d, r, c], 4) >
max[r, c]) || (Math.Round(Belief[d,
r, c], 4) < min[r, c]))
{
Conso!e.WriteLine("{0} {1}
{2}", Belief[d, r, c], max[r, c],
min[r, cj);
foundAnomaly = true;
break;
}

}
if (foundAnomaly == true)
{
res[r]++;
if (r == targetFeature - 1)
{
if (ans == "FAR")
{
Console.Write("\tfeature {0}
is an anomaly!!!", (r +
l).ToString());
SW.Write("\tfeature {0} is an
anomaly!!!", (r +
l).ToString()) ;
>

else if (ans == "DR")
{
Conso!e.Write("\tfeature {0}
is normal!", (r +
l).ToString());
SW.Write("\tfeature {0} is
normal!", (r + l).ToString());
>

}
continue;
}
}
if (foundAnomaly == false)

if (ans== "FAR")
{
Console.Write(" normal!", (d + l).ToString());
SW.Writef normal!", (d + l).ToString());
}
else if (ans= = "DR")
{
Conso!e.Write(" anomaly!!!", (d + l),ToString());
SW.Write(" anomaly!!!", (d + l).ToString());
}
}
}

Console.WriteLine();
SW.WriteLine();
}
Console.WriteLine();
StreamReader Title = new StreamReaderCstatesFromTraining.txt");
Console.WriteLine();
SW.WriteUne("
--—");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
SW.Write("f{0}: {1} [ ", (r + l).ToString(),
Convert. ToInt32(Title.ReadLine()));
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r] - 1; C++)
SW.Write("{0}; ", Title.ReadLine());
SW.Write('T);
SW.WriteLine();
}
SW.WriteLine("
——-—
—
-");
if (ans == "DR")
{
SW.WriteLine("\nDR:,!);
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if (r = = targetFeature - 1)
{
Console.WriteLine("DR of feature {0} is:
{ l : f 3 } % " , (r + l).ToString(), ((double)(DiffStruc +
res[r]) / NumberOfSamples) * 100);

SW.WriteLine(n\si\tf{0}: { l : f 3 } % ", (r +
l).ToString(), ((double)(DiffStruc + res[r]) /
NumberOfSamples) * 100);
}
}
}
else if (ans= = "FAR")
{
SW.WriteLine("\nFAR:");
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)
{
Consoie.WriteLine("FAR of feature {0} is:
{ l : f 3 } % " , (r + l).ToString(), ((double)(DiffStruc +
res[r]) / NumberOfSamples) * 100);
SW.WriteLine("\n\tf{0}: { l : f 3 } % " , (r +
l).ToString(), ((double)(DiffStruc + res[r]) /
NumberOfSamples) * 100);
}
}
}
SW.CIose();
FN.CIose();
}
// compute causal reasoning (pi)
static void causalReasoningComputation(int NumberOfFeatures, int
MaxNumberOfStates, int[] NumberOfRows, int[] NumberOfStates,
int[,] CellValues, int Sample, double[,,] Pi, StreamWriter PiRecord,
StreamWriter EvaluatePiRecord, doublet,] TempPi, doublet,] Total, int
targetFeature)
{
Console.Writel_ine("\nsample " + Sample.ToStringO);
int[,] freq = new int[NumberOfFeatures, MaxNumberOfStates];
for (int f = 0; f < NumberOfFeatures; f++)
{
if ((f + 1) == targetFeature)
{
if (Sample < 9)
EvaluatePiRecord. Write("\nsampfe" + (Sample +
l).ToString() + "\t\t");

else
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("\nsample" + (Sample +
l).ToString() + "\t");
int k = 0;
for (int j = 0; j < NumberOfRows[Sample]; j + + )
{
for (k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[f]; k++)
{
if (CellValuesrj, f] == k + 1)
{
freq[f, k]++;
break;
}
}
>

Consent;. WriteLine("\tfeature " + (f + l).ToString());
for (k = 0; k < NumberOfStates[f]; k++)
{
TempPi[f, k] = (double)freq[f, k] /
NumberOfRows[Sample];
Total [f, k] = Total[f, k] + TempPi[f, k];
Conso!e.WriteLine("\t\tstate " + (k + l).ToString()
+ " p i : {0:f4} ", TempPi[f, k]);
PiRecord.WriteLine("{0:f4}", TempPi[f, k]);
EvaluatePiRecord.Write("{0:f4}\t", TempPi[f, k]);
Pi[Sample, f, k] = TempPi[f, k];
}
EvaluatePiRecord.WriteUne();
}
}
}
// compute diagnostic reasoning (lambda)
static void disgnosticReasoningComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet,] Mean, doublet,,]
Pi, StreamWriter EvaluateLambdaRecord, doublet, ,] Lambda, int
targetFeature)
{
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{

if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)

{
if (d < 9)
EvaluateLambdaRecord,Write("\nsam
pie" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t\t");
else
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write("\nsam
pie" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t");
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r];
C+ + )
{
if (Mean[r, c] == 0)
{
Lambda[d, r, c] = 1;
EvaluateLambdaRecord.Write(
"{0:f4}\t", Lambda[d, r, c]);
}
else
{
Lambda[d, r, c] = Pi[d, r, c] /
Mean[r, c];
Eva I uateLambda Record. Write(
"{0:f4}\t" # Lambda[d, r, c]);
}
>

EvaluateLambdaRecord.WriteLine();
}
}
}
}
// compute sigma
static void sigmaComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet,,] Pi, doublet,,]
Lambda, doublet,] Sigma, StrearnWriter EvaluateSigmaRecord, int
targetFeature)
{
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)

{
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r];
C+ + )
{
Sigmatd, r] = Sigmatd, r] + Pi[d, r,
c] * Lambdatd, r, c];
}
EvaluateSigmaRecord.WriteLine("{0:f4}",
Sigmatd, r]);
}
}
}
}
// compute belief (by applying the Bayes's rule)
static void beliefComputation(int NumberOfSamples, int
NumberOfFeatures, int[] NumberOfStates, doublet, ,] Pi, doublet,,]
Lambda, doublet,] Sigma, doublet,,] Belief, StreamWriter
EvaluateBeliefRecord, int targetFeature)
{
for (int d = 0; d < NumberOfSamples; d++)
{
for (int r = 0; r < NumberOfFeatures; r++)
{
if ((r + 1) == targetFeature)

{
if (d < 9)
EvaluateBeliefRecord, Write("\nsamp!e
" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t\t");
else
EvaluateBeliefRecord,Write("\nsample
" + (d + l).ToString() + "\t");
for (int c = 0; c < NumberOfStates[r];
C+ + )
{
if (Sigmatd, r] == 0)
Belieftd, r, c] = 1;
else
Belieftd, r, c] = Pi[d, r, c] *
Lambdatd, r, c] / Sigmatd, r];
EvaluateBeliefRecord.Write(*'{0:f4}\t
", Belieftd, r, c]);
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}
EvaluateBeliefRecord.WriteLine();
}
}
}
}
}
}
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